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This thesis focuses on the similarities and differences between 
humanitarian organization procurement and contingency contracting.  More 
specifically, it asks whether there are best practices performed by private 
volunteer organizations (PVOs) that can be applied to contingency contracting 
during stability operations.  To answer this question, this thesis reviews the 
procurement processes of two PVOs responding to the humanitarian needs in 
the Republic of Uzbekistan and compares them to the procedures of contingency 
contracting officers in Uzbekistan supporting Operation Enduring Freedom.   
Based on the information collected by interviewing members of several 
PVOs in Uzbekistan, including in-depth interviews with the staff of two PVOs - 
Heart to Heart and Samaritan's Purse - as well as contingency contracting 
officers in Uzbekistan, this thesis identifies and discusses three best practices 
applicable to contingency contracting.  These best practices are: 1) develop 
hands-on, in-depth contingency contracting training methods including scenario-
based training, temporary duty assignments at deployed contingency contracting 
cells for contingency contracting officer trainees, and contracting officer 
internships with PVOs; 2) empower contingency contracting officers under 
Executive Order 10789 with full control of all purchases under $50,000.00; and 3) 
network with PVOs already operating in country to obtain socio-economic and 
market data typically unavailable to contingency contracting officers upon initial 
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Success in complex humanitarian emergencies will be determined 
by the degree to which all of the players can step outside of their 
individual cultures and value systems, surrender some of their 
autonomy, and seek the best, rather than the worst, in those with 
whom they must solve the problems they confront. 
Andrew Natsios 
Director, U.S. Agency for International Development 
 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis compares and contrasts Private Volunteer Organization (PVO) 
procurement during humanitarian missions with contingency contracting 
supporting stability operations.  It examines PVOs responding to the needs in 
Uzbekistan as well as military contingency contracting officers in Uzbekistan 
supporting Operation Enduring Freedom.  Its purpose is to identify PVO 
procurement best practices applicable to contingency contracting.  Adapting PVO 
procurement methods to contingency contracting could improve performance, 
save funds, and mitigate risk.   
After establishing the similarities between PVO missions and military 
stability operations, this thesis compares the policies and procedures applicable 
to contingency contracting with the procedures of two PVOs.  It then explores the 
procurement operations of PVOs and outlines the best practices gleaned from 
these organizations applicable to contingency contracting within the Armed 
Forces.  This study concludes with recommendations for implementation of PVO 
best practices.  See Table I-1 below. 
Chapter Outline 
A.  Purpose  
B.  Background  
C.  Research Objective  
D.  Research Questions 
1.  Primary Research Question 
2.  Subsidiary Research Questions  
E.  Scope 
F.  Methodology – Case Study 
G.  Benefits of the Research 
H.  Organization of the Thesis 
Table I-1 
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B. BACKGROUND – MILITARY AND PVO OPERATIONAL PARALLELS 
The missions of humanitarian organizations and stability operations are 
similar and thus conducive to comparison.  Over the last ten years, the military 
has performed an ever-increasing role in stability operations, supporting peace 
agreements, assisting displaced persons, and responding to natural disasters.  
As the Armed Forces perform operations other than war, it steps into a role that 
humanitarian organizations have been performing for decades.  Beginning with 
Clara Barton’s founding of the American Red Cross in 1881, and rapidly growing 
in number since World War II, United States-based PVOs have responded to 
innumerable armed conflicts and natural disasters across the globe.   
No organizations have more similar missions to military stability operations 
than humanitarian organizations.  PVOs perform the unusual job of voluntarily 
responding to world crises.  The environment to which they and our Armed 
Forces typically respond is austere.  Goods and services are scarce.  The 
security threat may be high.  The Rule of Law may not exist.  Obtaining goods 
and services in these circumstances – known as an “immature contracting 
environment” – has similar challenges for both PVOs and military forces. 
Additionally, private volunteer organizations operate with limited financial 
resources (donations) and as Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) 
charitable organizations, are subject to a level of scrutiny similar to the oversight 
given to Government expenditures.  Reliant on donated cash, goods, and 
services to operate, negative press about a PVO’s imprudent financial 
stewardship can cause donations to dwindle.  Similarly, careless spending within 
the Government attracts negative attention and can result in reduced or restricted 
funding.    
Given the emphasis on executing Government contracts as “prudent 
business-persons,” it seems that best practices valuable to the military could be 
learned from observing the PVO procurement business.  Further, because of the 
similarities between humanitarian missions and stability operations, it is possible 
that humanitarian organizations have developed methods of procurement that 
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the Armed Forces could incorporate into its practices.  By incorporating PVO 
procurement practices, contingency contracting officers may improve contract 
performance, lower costs, and reduce risk. 
 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE – DETERMINE PVO BEST PRACTICES 
APPLICABLE TO CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING  
This research focuses on the procurement actions of selected PVOs to 
discover best practices applicable to contingency contracting in immature 
contracting environments and recommends means to successfully implement 
them.  For the purpose of this study, a best practice is a process or method used 
by PVOs that produces positive  results and is applicable to contingency 
contracting.  Areas researched include the operational and financial practices of 
PVOs affecting their purchasing as well as their methods of procurement during 
humanitarian missions.   
 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. Primary Research Question 
Comparing and contrasting the procurement methods of private volunteer 
organizations and contingency contracting operations when responding to 
remote regions in crisis can glean what best practices? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions   
· What parallels exist between the missions PVOs perform and stability 
operations that lend credence to a comparison of their procurement 
systems? 
· How are PVO procurement and contingency contracting 
similar/different in: 
§ Degree of preparation prior to negotiation and execution of 
contracts? 
§ Types of contracts used? 
§ Policies, regulations, and standing operating procedures? 
§ Organizational structure, reporting, warranting, and authority? 
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§ Prices paid on similar contracts in the same region? 
§ Methods for establishment of in-country operations? 
§ Methods of contracting while sustaining operations? 
 
· What best practices can the Armed Forces learn from PVO 
procurement, and how can these lessons be incorporated into 
contingency contracting policies and procedures?   
· What barriers exist that prevent implementation of best practices 
discovered, and how can these barriers be overcome? 
· What conclusions can be drawn and recommendations applied to 
contingency contracting during stability operations when compared 
with PVO procurement? 
 
E. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis includes: 
· A review of ongoing contingency contracting operations in Uzbekistan 
in support of Operation Enduring Freedom; 
· An in-depth analysis of one PVO’s procurement during a December 
2001 medical airlift to Uzbekistan; 
· A brief review of contingency contracting guidelines; 
· A detailed discussion of the procurement operations of two PVOs; 
· An assessment of best practices learned from PVOs applicable to the 
military contingency contracting; 
· Recommendations for implementation of best practices learned. 
 
F. METHODOLOGY – CASE STUDY 
This thesis is not a post-operation analysis of reports and after action 
reviews.  Rather, my research consists of a real-time case analysis of PVOs 
responding to the needs in Uzbekistan and the military contingency contracting 
officers that are supporting Operation Enduring Freedom.  Because of 
information classification (information that cannot be released), operational 
security concerns (information that should not be released), and the sometimes 
chaotic nature of researching military operations in real time, there are inherent 
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weaknesses in the data.  Nevertheless, the data presented are as complete and 
accurate as possible, and support useful conclusions.  The PVOs chosen for 
study are Heart to Heart International and Samaritan’s Purse.  These PVOs were 
selected because 
· They have responded to many of the same regional conflicts as the 
military, either prior to or concurrently with the military, including Haiti, 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Rwanda, and hurricanes Mitch 
and Andrew; 
· They view cooperation with the military favorably; 
· They depend upon donations to finance operations and emphasize 
fiscal responsibility.  
 
The research includes a ten-day fact finding trip with Barbi Moore, Director 
of International Operations for Heart to Heart, during a December 2001 medical 
airlift to Uzbekistan, observing Heart to Heart’s procurement practices in detail.  
This trip occurred as the Friendship Bridge linking Uzbekistan and Afghanistan 
was first reopened and PVOs were scrambling to establish the flow of 
humanitarian aid into Mazar i Sharif.   
I conducted multiple in-person and telephone interviews using my 
research questions as a basis for discussion.  I interviewed three military 
contingency contracting officers currently operating in key locations within 
Uzbekistan as well as one officer who has re-deployed from the region.  Within 
Heart to Heart and Samaritan's Purse, I interviewed at length those persons 
managing the finances during field operations and the directors or 
assistant/deputy directors of international humanitarian operations.  While in 
Uzbekistan, I frequently spoke with members of six additional PVOs operating 
continuously in country, Uzbek physicians, members of the U.S. Department of 
State, and the Republic of Uzbekistan Minister for Humanitarian Assistance.  I 
also observed coordination meetings between Heart to Heart and U.S. Embassy 
representatives, Uzbek Government officials at the national and regional levels, 
and Uzbek and Afghan businessmen. 
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I visited hospitals in Samarqand and Tashkent and an orphanage for 
disabled children in Tashkent, reviewing Heart to Heart’s means of assessing 
needs for future missions.  Heart to Heart’s Senior Vice President of International 
Operations incorporated me into the airlift, naming me as Heart to Heart’s 
representative during the distribution by air of medical supplies to Urganch and 
Nukus.  In this capacity I met with the regional health ministers and ensured 
successful transfer of the aid.   
As part of my research I reviewed PVO written policies, PVO training 
practices, Federal, Department of Defense, and Army contingency contracting 
regulations, Department of Defense joint publications, and relevant literature – 
theses, position papers, and studies – on PVOs and contingency contracting.   
 
G. BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH 
The contingency contracting community will benefit from a fresh 
perspective on the unique contingency contracting field provide by examining 
POV procurement.  This research provides useful best practices for 
implementation, as well as increases the body of knowledge about humanitarian 
organizations within the military.  This thesis supports Presidential Decision 
Directive 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, which requires 
cooperation and coordination between the military, civilian agencies, and 
NGOs/PVOs during large-scale humanitarian and stability operations. 
 
H. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II establishes definitions of 
key terms used throughout the thesis and briefly reviews the policies and 
regulations applicable to contingency contracting.  Included is a discussion of the 
role of humanitarian organizations in regional conflicts, the mission, structure, 
and operation of humanitarian organizations, and a brief background of the PVOs 
studied.  The chapter draws parallels between the mission of humanitarian 
organizations and the military, and concludes with an overview of Operation 
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Enduring Freedom in Uzbekistan.  Chapter III presents the training, policies, 
procedures, organization, and execution of contracting within the two studied 
humanitarian organizations, chronicles observations I made during the Heart to 
Heart medical airlift, and reviews the contracting procedures employed by the 
contingency contracting officers in Uzbekistan.  Chapter IV identifies PVO best 
practices for implementation into contingency contracting, identifying barriers to 
implementation and potential means to overcome those barriers.  With Chapter 






















By melding the capabilities of the military and the NGOs and PVOs 
you have developed a force multiplier. 
Madeleine Albright 
Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations 
 
A. PURPOSE OF THIS CHAPTER 
This chapter identifies key terms and concepts related to PVOs, doctrine 
and policy, and contingency contracting; highlights joint doctrine’s support of 
interaction with PVOs; discusses the similarities between PVO operations and 
stability operations; and familiarizes the reader with the PVOs studied: Heart to 
Heart International and Samaritan's Purse.  The chapter concludes with an 
unclassified overview of Operation Enduring Freedom (see Table II-1).  After 
reading this chapter, the reader should agree that 1) similarities between PVO 
operations and stability operations establish a sound foundation for a 
comparison; 2) doctrine supports cooperation between the military and PVOs; 
and 3) Heart to Heart and Samaritan's Purse represent common organizations 
responding to humanitarian needs. 
 
Chapter Outline 
A.  Purpose  
B.  Key Terms and Concepts    
1.  Distinctions Between PVOs/NGOs  
2.  Interagency Coordination: PDD 56 
3.  Stability Operations 
4.  Procurement 
5.  Contingency Contracting 
a.  Contingency Contracting Regulations 
Support Interaction with PVOs 
b.  Contingency Contracting Inflates 
Prices, Hinders PVOs 
C.  Joint Doctrine Encourages Coordination 
with PVOs  
D.  Joint Doctrine Provides a Means for PVO 
Coordination 
E.  Section Summary 
F.  Private Volunteer Organizations  
1.  PVO Classification 
a.  PVO Missions Vary 
b. RAND NGO/PVO Classification  
2.  Fiscal Similarities Between PVOs and 
the Military 
3.  Operational Similarities Between PVOs 
and the Military 
4.  Section Summary  
G.  Heart to Heart International  
H.  Samaritan's Purse  
I.   Operation Enduring Freedom   
J.  Chapter Summary 
Table II-1 
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B.  KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
1. Distinctions Between Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) 
and Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs) 
Although their missions are essentially the same, PVOs and NGOs do 
differ.  Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than 
War (JP 3-07), defines PVOs as “nonprofit humanitarian assistance 
organizations involved in development and relief activities.”  There are tens of 
thousands of PVOs with international operations and millions more focused on 
one region only.  PVOs work with the United Nations (UN), but unlike NGOs are 
not formally recognized by the UN. 
NGOs are “transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a 
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the 
United Nations (UN).”  [Ref. 1]  To obtain NGO status, an applying organization 
must be at least two years old, democratically managed, primarily non-
Government funded, and perform activities relevant to the work of the ECOSOC.  
There are currently 2091 NGOs registered with the ECOSOC [Ref. 2].  Believing 
the organizational requirements necessary to become NGOs may limit an 
organization’s decision making flexibility, I chose to research only PVOs. 
Although the terms PVO and NGO are often used synonymously, 
throughout this document I use the strict definition of PVO in accordance with JP 
3-07.  However, I often quote material that makes no distinction, using only the 
term NGO.   
2. Interagency Coordination: Presidential Decision Directive 56, 
“Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” (PDD 56)  
PDD 56 directs Government agencies including the Department of State, 
National Security Council, and Department of Defense to develop interagency 
training on crisis response and create an interagency executive committee to 
better coordinate the U.S. response to foreign crises.  A Na tional Security 
Council white paper on the directive is located in Appendix B.  PDD 56, issued by 
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President Clinton in May 1997 and reaffirmed by President Bush, [Ref. 3] defines 
a complex contingency operation as “peace operations such as the [Dayton] 
peace accord implementation … the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq 
called Operation Provide Comfort … and foreign humanitarian assistance 
operations.”  [Ref. 4] 
PDD 56 notes that the military can quickly create the conditions necessary 
to resolve a conflict, but “many aspects of complex emergencies may not best be 
addressed through military measures.”  It directs the military to coordinate its 
operations with civilian Governmental agencies (for example, the State 
Department) and international organizations (the UN, NGOs, and PVOs) during 
complex contingency operations.  Integrated planning and coordination can 
“avoid delays, reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in 
unplanned ways, and create unity of effort … essential for the success of the 
operation.”  [Ref 4]  
To date, little has been done within the federal agencies directed by PDD 
56 to develop inter-agency coordination, training, and conduct contingency 
planning.  A report prepared late in 1999 by AB Technologies for the Joint 
Exercise and Training Division of the Joint Staff noted that few of the dozens of 
agencies included in the directive were even “marginally addressing” PDD 56 
training requirements.  The National Security Council, proponent of the PDD and 
designated lead agency, has not stepped forward in a leadership role.  AB 
Technologies found that there is no leadership, authority, accountability, training 
structure, training standards, or financial resources committed to implementing 
the Presidential directive.  [Refs. 5, 6] 
Although PDD 56 establishes a framework for greater coordination with 
PVOs,  
[u]nfortunately, operations that have employed PDD 56 processes 
have not included NGOs or any outside international organizations 
in the U.S. interagency process, training, planning, rehearsing, 
decision-making, or crisis management [Ref. 7]. 
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3. Stability Operations 
 Complex contingency operations, in the context of military doctrine, are 
categorized as stability operations.  Army Field Manual 3 -0, Operations, defines 
stability operations as those operations that  
promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the 
threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational 
environment through peacetime developmental, cooperative 
activities and coercive actions in response to a crisis.  [Ref. 8] 
 
Stability operations, sometimes termed Military Operations other than War, 
include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian and civic assistance, 
foreign internal defense (protection of a Government), counter-drug operations, 
show of force, and counter-terrorism (offensive operations designed to interdict 
terrorists).  Stability operations frequently require applications of combat power.  
Commonly referred to as a ‘War on Terrorism’ or the ‘War in Afghanistan,’ 
Operation Enduring Freedom is in many ways a stability operation combining 
foreign internal defense, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian assistance. 
4. Procurement 
Although the term procurement is often used synonymously with 
acquisition, the two terms are distinct.  Procurement, for the purpose of this 
thesis, is the process of evaluating, selecting, and purchasing existing supplies or 
services.  Acquisition is a strategic planning, management, and procurement 
process.  Acquisition encompasses the complete process from the identification 
of a need through research, design, production, fielding, and disposal.   
Contingency contracting officers and humanitarian organizations are 
focused on procurement to satisfy mission requirements.  Common procurement 
actions during stability operations include purchase of perishable rations and 
water, consumable supplies like paper products, and equipment including tents 
and generators.  Services are also contracted for construction of temporary 
structures as well as support services like linguists, food service help, or 
communications support. 
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5. Contingency Contracting 
Contingency contracting is the process used to obtain the essential 
supplies, services, and construction necessary to conduct and support a military 
operation “responsively, effectively, and legally”.  Contingency contracting is a 
critical initial component of the overall process of providing logistics resources to 
the supported force.  It bridges gaps that occur “before military logistics 
resources can be mobilized, and in some cases will be necessary for the duration 
of the contingency, humanitarian, or peacekeeping operation.”  [Ref. 9] 
Contingency contracting differs from traditional contracting in that several 
exceptions to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) are granted to expedite 
procurement of essential products and services.  CPT William Robare, in his 
March 2000 thesis Guidance for Contingency Contracting Officers Preparing for 
MOOTW, provides an excellent summary of the regulatory and statutory 
requirements governing contingency contracting.  As a summary of those 
requirements, Table II-2 lists allowable exceptions to FAR requirements [Ref. 9].  
Note that urgent and compelling or emergency conditions do not permit a blanket 
waiver of FAR requirements.  The Department of Defense and Agency 
Supplements to the FAR provide additional exceptions to agency requirements 
during contingency operations.   
Contingency contracting officers receive formal training on basic 
contracting actions as mandated by the Defense Acquisition Improvement Act.  
Included in the training is one two-week course on contingency contracting.  Non-
Commissioned Officers’ typically receive only on-the-job training.  [Ref. 11]  
In reviewing contingency contracting supporting stability operations throughout 
the 1990s, CPT Robare found that contingency contracting officers are generally 
inadequately trained.  In garrison, contingency contracting officers “mostly focus 
on installation requirements.  With inadequate time to train and plan for MOOTW, 
contingency contracting officers struggle with the shift in contracting 
environments …”  [Ref. 10] 
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FAR Reference Subject Exceptions Allowed 
5.202(a)(12) Synopsis  Does not apply overseas if subject to the Trade Agreements Act or North American Free Trade Agreement. 
5.202(a)(3) Synopsis  
International agreement, treaty or organization specifies the source of 
supply. For contracts by written direction of foreign Governments 
reimbursing cost of acquisition. 
5.202(a)(2) Synopsis  Not applicable for purchases using simplified acquisition procedures, if unusual and compelling urgency exists. 
5.202(a)(2). Synopsis  Omitting synopses of proposed contract actions when it would delay award and injure the Government 
6.001(a) Competition Requirements 
Does not apply to contracts awarded using the simplified acquisition 
procedures in FAR Part 13. 
6.302-2 Competition Requirements 
Permits limiting sources in solicitations when an urgent and compelling 
requirement precludes full & open competition 
12.1 Commercial Items  Allows the acquisition of commercial items up to $5 million 
13.111(b)  Covenant Against Contingent Fees 




Subcontractor Sales to 
the Government 
Not applicable to contracts or subcontracts at or below the simplified 
acquisition threshold. 
13.111(d) Anti-kickback Procedures 
Not applicable to contracts or subcontracts at or below the simplified 
acquisition threshold. 
13.111(e) Audit and Records  Negotiation 
Not applicable to contracts or subcontracts at or below the simplified 
acquisition threshold. 
13.111(f) 
Contract Work Hours 
and Safety Standards 
Act 
Not applicable to contracts or subcontracts at or below the simplified 
acquisition threshold. 
13.111(g) Drug Free Workplace 
Certification 
Not applicable to contracts or subcontracts at or below the simplified 
acquisition threshold. 
13.111(h) Estimate of Recovered 
Material 
Not applicable to contracts or subcontracts at or below the simplified 
acquisition threshold. 
25.102(a)(1) Buy American Act Not applicable for items purchased outside U.S. and it’s territories. 
25.302(b) International Balance of 
Payments Program 
Acceptable to buy foreign at or below the simplified acquisition threshold. 
25.501 Payment in Local Currency 
Contracts executed outside the US with local foreign firms payable in local 
currency unless international agreement grants payment in U.S. dollars or 
contracting officer determines local currency to be inappropriate. 
16.603; 
15.402(f) Undefinitized contracts  
Permits oral solicitations, letter contracts and other forms of undefinitized 
contract actions to speed the start of work 




Restrictions on Certain 
Foreign Bonds 
Authorized to buy items restricted under 25.702(a) in unusual situations for 







For contracts awarded and performed or for purchases made outside the 
United States in support of a contingency, humanitarian, or peacekeeping 
operations, the simplified acquisition threshold is raised to $200,000 
Table II-2 Contingency Contracting FAR Exceptions  After: REF [9] 
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a. Contingency Contracting Regulations Support 
Interaction with PVOs 
The Army’s Contingency Contracting Manual lists PVOs as 
organizations that contingency contracting officers “may require interaction with” 
to support the force, but it does not elaborate on the nature or purpose of 
interaction with PVOs.  The manual also notes that an understanding of local 
culture and business practices has a considerable impact on contracting.  [Ref. 9] 
b. Contingency Contracting Inflates Prices, Hinders PVOs 
A study by the Center for Naval Analyses noted that contingency 
contracting can negatively impact humanitarian operations.  Current contingency 
contracting procedures 
 often lead to a situation where prices for local resources are 
artificially inflated [emphasis mine] because various elements of the 
[military task force] and the relief organizations are bidding against 
each other for the same resource.  This has the effect of pricing the 
NGOs/PVOs out of the market, unnecessarily increasing the cost of 
U.S. deployments, inhibiting relief efforts, and disrupting existing 
logistics systems already in place.  [Ref. 12] 
Price inflation remains after the military forces leave, according to the study, and 
continues to hinder NGO/PVO procurement. 
 
C. JOINT DOCTRINE ENCOURAGES COORDINATION WITH PVOs 
Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, 
Volume I (JP 3-08), notes that PVOs possess “considerable information that may 
be essential to the success of the military operation” that is not available through 
military channels [Ref. 13].  JP 3-08 lists six reasons why PVOs should be used 
as an information source for contingency operations.  Specifically, PVOs 
understand: 
· the needs of the population; 
· local culture and practices; 
· the broader historical perspective and can provide insights into the 
factors contributing to the situation at hand; 
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· the local political structure, political aims of various parties, and the 
roles of key leaders; 
· the security threat, hotspots, and safe areas; 
· the role and capabilities of the host-nation Government. 
 
The Joint Warfighting Center produced the Joint Task Force Commander’s 
Handbook for Peace Operations in 1995.  Like PDD56, the Handbook 
encourages coordination with PVOs to achieve unity of effort.  It advises logistics 
planners to consider not only their own transportation needs against supply route 
capacity, but also that of PVOs.  For example, delays and bottlenecks could 
occur if a military convoy and PVO shipment of goods attempt to use the same 
supply routes simultaneously.  The Handbook adds that PVOs may have an 
understanding of railheads, storage facilities, and local freight handling firms that 
could prove invaluable to newly arrived logistics planners.  [Ref. 14] 
 
D. JOINT DOCTRINE PROVIDES A MEANS FOR PVO COORDINATION 
Civil-Military operations “establish and maintain positive relations” 
between U.S. forces, multinational and indigenous security forces, the host 
Government, and nongovernmental organizations.  In some instances, the force 
may need to interact with civilian businesses in the operational area that have an 
influence on the local Government, economy, and people.  [Ref. 15] 
The primary means to achieve  unity of effort and coordination with PVOs 
during stability operations is via a civil-military coordination cell.  At higher levels 
of authority, a humanitarian assistance coordination center, humanitarian 
operations center, or both may also be established to improve inter-agency 
communications.  At the task force level, the commander establishes a civil-
military operations center (CMOC).  Table II-3 lists the functions and composition 
of these coordination cells.  
The CMOC is the conduit of information and coordination between the 
military force, United Nations, host nation Governments (local, regional, and/or  
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national), NGOs, and PVOs.  The CMOC typically is an administrative center led 
by the task force commander’s senior civil affairs officer.   
The CMOC is located within the secure perimeter of the task force, 
removed from sensitive areas, and close to an entry/exit point to easily admit 
visitors.  When host nation officials wish to bring issues to the attention of the 
military force, when NGOs/PVOs seek threat information for a specific region, or 
when claims are made for damage caused by the military force, the CMOC is the 
common vehicle to communicate this information to the commander.   
Comparison Between Humanitarian Operations Center,  
Humanitarian Coordination Center,  
and Civil-Military Operations Center 
 Establishing 
Authority 















U.S. Embassy  









and planning at the 
STRATEGIC level.  
Normally is disbanded 
once a HOC or CMOC 
is established. 













Assists in coordination 
of activities at the 
OPERATIONAL level 













Local Host Nation 
Government 
Multinational Forces 





Humanitarian Operations Center 
Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center 
Civil-Military Operations Center 
*Commander 
at any level 
may establish 
Table II-3  Coordination Cell Comparisons, After: REF[15] 
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E. SECTION SUMMARY 
Summarizing the previous sections, Presidential Decision Directive 56 
requires inter-agency coordination during complex contingency operations, 
including Private Volunteer Organizations.  Joint doctrine repeatedly discuses the 
value of including PVOs when planning logistics, collecting information, 
establishing Government contacts, and assessing threat.  The Army contingency 
contracting manual alludes to PVOs as a resource when conducting contingency 
contracting operations.  The following sections better define PVOs and the 
similarities with the military. 
 
F. PRIVATE VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS 
1. PVO Classification 
Non-governmental and private volunteer organizations spend between $9 
and $10 billion assisting over 250 million people annually, more than any national 
or international Government.  [Ref. 14]  There are more than 26,000 NGOs/PVOs 
operating internationally, and several million more that provide services in only 
one country [Ref. 16].  These organizations vary by size, skill, mission, and 
degree of cooperation with the Government and military.  Frequently, PVOs 
operate in remote, impoverished, and often war-torn areas long before the 
military arrives.   
a. PVO Missions Vary 
Most PVOs have a common mission: to improve the human 
condition.  On this common foundation, however, are built incredibly varied 
structures.  There are many ways to group PVOs by mission.  Some focus on 
meeting physical needs, others on education and training, socio-economic 
development, or political change.  Some are problem or issue-oriented, focusing 
on refugees, for instance, while others are focused on promoting an ideology, like 
environmental awareness.  PVOs are sometimes formed to respond to specific 
countries or for a particular crisis.  PVOs can also be divided by whether they 
provide immediate response to a crisis or long-term assistance.   
 19
PVOs fall into three basic mission categories:  broad spectrum, 
specialized, and advocacy.  Broad spectrum PVOs provide humanitarian relief 
and assistance through a wide range of services, providing food, shelter, 
clothing, economic assistance, education and training, etc., based on need.  
Specialized PVOs focus on one task – infant immunizations, for example.  
Advocacy groups promote issue awareness and encourage change through 
lobbying and education, but provide little material assistance. 
Much like the military during stability operations, they must have 
permission from the host nation to officially operate in most countries.  A host 
nation agreement is signed, similar to agreements with military forces, identifying 
both PVO and host nation responsibilities. 
b. RAND Corporation’s NGO/PVO Classification  
Organizational complexity is varied.  Many large PVOs are staffed 
with full-time salaried employees and have clearly defined structure, policies, and 
procedures.  Volunteers run other PVOs informally, but not necessarily 
haphazardly.  A study by RAND, Inc. categorized PVOs and NGOs using two 
criteria:  mission category and military cooperation.  Table II-4 presents RAND’s 
classification system.  Note the only difference between Core-Team and Core-
Individual is willingness to cooperate with the military.  [Ref 17] 
RAND 
Category Characteristics 
Core-Team Highly competent, broadly capable, and predisposed to cooperate with the military 
Core-Individual Highly competent, broadly capable, but less eager to cooperate with the military 
Specialized Highly competent and capable in select functional areas 
Advocacy Dedicated to promoting human rights but not normally providers of material assistance 
Minor Competent but having less capability than Core organizations 
Table II-4  RAND Corporation NGO/PVO Classification System 
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Coordination between the military and the relief community is often 
difficult.  RAND found that many humanitarian organizations keep their distance 
from the Armed Forces.  RAND offered the following reasons [REF 17]:   
· Differing Mission Duration.  PVOs frequently operate in the area long 
before the military arrives and remain long after it redeploys.  They 
often see the military as an expensive, flashy, and sometimes-
disruptive interloper that will accomplish a few well-publicized tasks 
and depart suddenly.  NGOs find the military’s need for an exit strategy 
distasteful, believing only a long term commitment can solve social 
problems. 
· Contrasting Organizational Culture.  NGOs typically use decentralized 
decision-making and may scorn the military chain of command.  NGOs 
may believe that the use of force will not bring about any lasting 
improvement.  They are critical of the military’s practice of classifying 
information, especially information that is readily available.  
· Desire to maintain neutrality and impartiality.  Many NGOs provide 
assistance based on need without choosing sides in a conflict.  An 
NGO’s reputation for neutrality and impartiality may be its best 
protection.  To move freely in an area of conflict and provide 
assistance to all victims, combatants must believe that NGOs will not 
assist any side preferentially.  NGOs will avoid a relationship with the 
military if it may compromise their reputation of neutrality. 
· Ignorance.  Military and NGO personnel often do not understand each 
other’s organizations and procedures.  Most military officers have a 
limited knowledge of NGOs and do not distinguish major organizations 
from minor ones.  NGOs may have unrealistic expectations of what the 
military can provide.  NGOs may also doubt the U.S. Government’s 
willingness to commit its military to humanitarian missions.  Many 
NGOs, believing that the United States approaches humanitarian relief 
in an ad hoc manner, hesitate to devote resources to improving ties to 
the military because the military may withdraw abruptly during a crisis 
or not help at all. 
 
2. Fiscal Similarities Between PVOs and the Military 
Both PVOs and military organizations have financial commonalities not 
found in businesses.  The military and PVOs alike do not generate profits, are 
financed primarily by external sources, are typically under resourced, and 
therefore must make frequent funding tradeoffs.  The level of external scrutiny 
over expenditures is another common thread.  Businesses share a common goal:  
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profit.  The public sector does not seek profit, nor do non-profit organizations.  
The measure of fiscal success for the military, like PVOs, is to expend funds 
efficiently, effectively, and responsibly to accomplish the mission.   
Unlike for-profit firms, PVOs are Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) 
tax-exempt organizations.  Their accounts are open to public review, and 
expense ratios are reported in the media.  Questionable PVO expenditures – like 
excessive executive salaries – receive criticism from the media similar to 
careless military purchases.  Financial blunders attract the attention of Congress 
for the military and the attention of donors for the PVO.  Bad press can dry up 
donations for PVOs and cause Congressional or Agency spending constraints 
and program cutbacks for the military. 
3. Operational Similarities Between PVOs and the Military: 
Humanitarian Operations vs. Stability Operations 
Like a military advance party arriving in country early to prepare for the 
main body’s arrival, better-organized PVOs have disaster assistance response 
teams (DARTs) on call to respond to crises.  These teams are frequently on the 
ground long before the military.  On arrival to a region in crisis, PVOs rapidly tie 
into the local humanitarian network.  Some type of religious, educational, cultural 
exchange, or economic development PVOs are typically operating in country 
before disaster strikes, becoming strategic links to incoming PVOs.    
To demonstrate the similarities between humanitarian and stability 
operations, consider this fictitious scenario:   
The director of a PVO receives a midnight phone call; there has 
been an earthquake in the Aral Sea region of Central Asia, a 
remote desert area with minimal resources.  The director places 
calls to his key staff setting an early morning meeting the next day.  
By seven A.M., the PVO staff is assembled.  One staffer gives a 
breakdown of the situation at the Aral Sea:  a small city of 60,000 
has been leveled … the hospital collapsed … there are no reports 
from villages in the region.  Another staff member reviews the 
supplies in the warehouse; blankets, plastic for shelters, and 
foodstuffs are well-stocked but medical supplies are low and some 
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of the medicines are expired – the donor gave them to obtain the 
tax benefit shortly before they became useless.  
The equipment for the operations center is loaded in two shipping 
containers and a draft inventory is passed across the table.  The 
director asks about personnel.  The personnel manager notes that 
the DART team is ready but short a physician; a request for a 
volunteer will be emailed to supporters following the meeting.  The 
finance manager reminds the staff that there are only enough funds 
to cover a fifteen-person team for 45 days or ten people for 60 
days. 
The director gives his guidance:  
· Deploy the DART within 36 hours; 
· Build a fifteen-person team ready to deploy in 96 hours; 
· Arrange for shipping of the operations equipment and available 
supplies immediately; 
· Plan for a three-month operation in spite of funding shortfall and 
send out an urgent request for funds to all donors. 
The director concludes with requests for additional details from all 
departments to be provided at a follow up meeting at 1:00 p.m.  He 
wants updates three times daily until the team departs, twice daily 
thereafter.   
 
Similar scenarios play out in PVOs at the onset of innumerable crises.  
Moreover, this same process takes place at military headquarters as a mission is 
handed down.  One could readily replace the title ‘director’ with ‘commander.’  
The role of the military commander and his staff is much the same.   
The parallels between a PVO’s response to a humanitarian crisis and a 
commander’s response to a contingency operation do not end with the initial 
action.  The essential tasks of a deploying force in stability operations are much 
the same as a PVO’s.  Both military and humanitarian organizations:  
· Utilize available personnel, equipment, and supplies to accomplish 
missions rather than produce products; 
· Respond to remote locations with minimal logistical support and rapidly 
stage to conduct operations;   
· Execute short-notice or no-notice operations; 
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· Respond to unknown regions with minimal time for planning; 
· Frequently support the same people groups; 
· Use the same infrastructure in a crisis region; 
· Place themselves at risk to accomplish the mission. 
 
Commander Edward Martin, Jr., in a Naval War College paper, 
commented that although at first glance military officers and PVO personnel 
seem very different and that the cultures are “completely misaligned,” a closer 
look 
reveals that the two worlds are not that far apart.  Members of both 
groups value service, dedication, and self sacrifice.  In many 
operations, they have the same objectives:  to restore stability to a 
region and return the populace to a pre-existing peace.  The roads 
to those objectives may vary, but the destination is the same.  
Educating military officers and NGO/PVO leadership to this will pay 
huge dividends.  [Ref. 18] 
 
4.  Section Summary 
PVOs are varied in structure and mission, but operate in the same 
environments, under similar scrutiny, with similar finances, and often at the same 
time as U.S. military forces.  PVOs often choose the same supply routes, 
coordinate with the same officials, and seek to assist the same people groups as 
the military.  The obstacles PVO procurement personnel must overcome to 
successfully execute their mission are very similar to the military’s contingency 
contracting officers, and hence PVOs are worthy of comparison.   
Having established the similarities between humanitarian organizations, 
their missions, the military, and stability operations, this chapter now turns to 
review the studied organizations in greater detail.  Applying RAND’s 
classification, the chapter reviews Heart to Heart – a small, specialized PVO – 
and Samaritan's Purse – a large, core-team organization.  The chapter concludes 
with an overview of Operation Enduring Freedom. 
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G. HEART TO HEART, INTERNATIONAL 
Heart to Heart International is a relief and development organization 
dedicated to encouraging volunteerism and mobilizing resources to provide 
humanitarian assistance throughout the world.  When characterized by RAND’s 
NGO/PVO classification system, Heart to Heart is a specialized organization, 
focusing on short-term infusions of medical and food aid.  Heart to Heart’s vision 
is fourfold:  
· Health: distribution of donated medical and pharmaceutical supplies as 
well as education and training; 
· Hunger: distribution of donated foodstuffs; 
· Hope: rapid mobilization of aid to victims of natural disasters and 
human tragedies; 
· Hands-on: developing a worldwide network of volunteers.  [Ref. 19] 
 
Established in 1992, Heart to Heart has delivered more than $210 million 
dollars in aid to more than 50 countries.  Resources are carefully managed.  
Donors contribute  over $1.5 million annually, of which Heart to Heart consumes 
only 2.4% for operating expenses.  The PVO leverages every donated dollar into 
$25 worth of medicines and supplies by using funds to solicit, process, and ship 
donations of goods and services from corporate donors including Aventis 
Pharmaceuticals, Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, Federal Express, Eli Lilly & 
Company, Johnson & Johnson, and numerous Farm Bureaus.  [Ref. 19] 
Heart to Heart emphasizes high-impact, short duration, missions via airlift 
or sealift.  It frequently assists regions in crisis at the same time or before the 
U.S. military responds, including Hurricane Andrew, Florida (1992), Bosnia-
Hercegovina and Croatia (1993, 1995), Somalia (1994), Hurricane Mitch, 
Honduras, (1998), Kosovo (1999), and Uzbekistan (1997, 1998, 1999, 2001).  
[Ref. 20] 
In December 2001, Heart to Heart delivered $2.3 million (wholesale value) 
worth of medical aid to three regions of Uzbekistan – Urganch, Nukus, and 
Andijon – and conducted assessments to prepare for a major airlift of 
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pharmaceuticals and physician-trainers for Summer 2002 in the Samarqand-
Karshi region (see Figure II-1) [Ref 21].  Heart to Heart is also establishing 
contacts in Mazar i Sharif, Afghanistan to deliver food and medicine.  [Ref. 22]. 
    
Figure II-1  Uzbekistan After: [Ref. 23] 
 
Heart to Heart maintains permanent staff in the U.S. and China only.  Most 
relief missions begin by sending an advance party to assess the need, then 
assembling a relief package tailored to the region.  The assessment team 
exploits established contacts in country to leverage their operation.  Contacts in 
country – other PVOs with permanent offices, host nation officials, the U.S. State 
Department, and private U.S. citizens working abroad – provide essential 
information and assistance, including communications support, documentation 
processing, customs, freight-forwarding, livery, storage, distribution, and 
monitoring.  [Ref. 22] 
 
H. SAMARITAN’S PURSE 
Samaritan's Purse is a nondenominational evangelical Christian 
organization providing aid to suffering people around the world.  Samaritan’s 
Purse is committed to both short and long term operations.  With an annual 
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operating budget over $100 million (ten times larger than Heart to Heart), 
Samaritan's Purse is best categorized by RAND’s PVO classification system as a 
core-team organization.   
Founded in 1970, Samaritan's Purse has helped the victims of war, 
poverty, natural disasters, disease, and famine by providing more than $113 
million in aid in 2000 alone to 115 nations including Serbia, Kosovo, Haiti, and 
Tajikistan.  Samaritan’s Purse has deployed 286 doctors on short-term medical 
missions to 21 countries.  In December 2001, Samaritan’s Purse delivered 
34,702 shoeboxes filled with donated Christmas gifts for Uzbek children.  This 
PVO receives, on average, 40% cash donations and 60% donated goods and 
services, and operates with a nine percent annual expense ratio.  [Ref. 24] 
Emergency response efforts at Samaritan’s Purse are structured around a 
Projects Department.  Within the 40-person department are Regional Directors 
who supervise multiple projects in a continental region.  Don Norrington, 
Assistant Director of Projects for Samaritan’s Purse, explains that once a crisis is 
identified, his PVO sends in a small survey team of two or three staff members to 
determine the needs.  This team usually includes a physician and an 
administrator.  If the survey team determines Samaritan's Purse should establish 
a short term project, the administrator often becomes the country coordinator.  A 
full-time coordinator deploys from the U.S. for long-term projects.  The 
coordinator manages all aspects of Samaritan's Purse’s response.  [Ref. 25] 
 
I. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM – UZBEKISTAN 
The mission statement for Operation Enduring Freedom has not been 
released.  However, on 8 November 2001, President Bush addressed the nation, 
saying,  
I have called our military into action to hunt down the members of 
the al Qaeda organization who murdered innocent Americans. …  
Our military is pursuing its mission.  We are destroying training 
camps, disrupting communications, and dismantling air 
defenses.  We are now bombing Taliban front lines.  We are 
deliberately and systematically hunting down these murderers, and 
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we will bring them to justice. …  We care for the innocent people of 
Afghanistan, so we continue to provide humanitarian aid, even 
while their Government tries to steal the food we send. …  We are 
at the beginning of our efforts in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan is 
only the beginning of our efforts in the world.  No group or nation 
should mistake Americans' intentions:  Where [a] terrorist group 
exists of global reach, the United States and our friends and allies 
will seek it out and we will destroy it.  [Ref. 26] 
 
The U.S. has forces operating in Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbekistan, 
supporting the President’s goals of destroying al Qaeda, disrupting 
communications, meeting humanitarian needs, and capturing the terrorists 
responsible for the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.  Details about 
Operation Enduring Freedom remain classified.  General Tommy Franks, 
Figure II- 2  Likely Troop Concentrations, After:  [Ref 28] 
 
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army Central Command, during a 21 November 
2001 press conference in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, was questioned by Information 
Agency Turkistan Press about the number of American soldiers at the Karshi-
Khanabad Air Base near Termez, Uzbekistan.  General Franks replied,  
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With respect to soldiers in Karshi-Khanabad, I will not tell you the 
number.  I will tell you the purpose of those forces is to provide for 
combat search and rescue.  That has been acknowledged and 
freely permitted by the Government of Uzbekistan.  It is also to set 
conditions for speeding humanitarian assistance to the people 
inside Afghanistan, and the security forces that are appropriate to 
provide force protection.  [Ref. 27] 
 
Jane’s Intelligence Review characterizes Uzbekistan as the “key northern 
staging point for U.S. and allied forces committed to possible military action in 
Afghanistan.”  Jane’s  estimates between 1500 and 2000 U.S. troops primarily 
from the 10th Mountain Division, but also U.S. Air Force and Army Special 
Forces, arrived in Uzbekistan 6 October 2001 and are based in Karshi-Khanabad 
at a Soviet-era air base conducting information operations, medical support, and 
special operations.  [Ref. 29]  Casualties occurring in Afghanistan are sometimes 
evacuated through Karshi en route to Europe.  [Ref. 30]  In Termez, Jane’s  
reports that the 10th Mountain Division has a reinforced battalion of light infantry 
at Camp Stronghold Freedom, presumably to monitor traffic to and from 
Afghanistan across the Friendship Bridge [Refs. 31, 55]. 
Supporting U.S. forces in Uzbekistan is a small group of contingency 
contracting officers.  Detailed from various commands throughout the world, 
these contingency contracting o fficers – mostly O-4 Majors – are operating in 
multiple locations in Uzbekistan purchasing supplies and services.  Details of 
interviews conducted with these contingency contracting officers follow in 
Chapter III. 
 
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Presidential, defense, and defense contracting literature support 
communication and cooperation with private volunteer organizations.  
Presidential Decision Directive 56 requires inter-agency coordination during 
complex contingency operations, including Private Volunteer Organizations.  
Joint doctrine repeatedly discusses the value of including PVOs when planning 
logistics, collecting information, establishing Government contacts, and 
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assessing threat.  The Army contingency contracting manual alludes to PVOs as 
a resource when conduction contingency contracting operations.   
PVOs are varied in structure and mission, but operate in the same 
environments, under similar scrutiny, with similar finances, and often at the same 
time as U.S. military forces.  PVOs delivering aid often choose the same supply 
routes, coordinate with the same officials, and seek to assist the same people 
groups as the military.  The obstacles PVO procurement personnel must 
overcome to successfully execute their mission are very similar to the military’s 
contingency contracting officers, and hence PVOs are worthy of comparison.   
The PVOs discussed in this thesis are conducting operations in 
Uzbekistan concurrently with the U.S. military.  Their procurement training, 
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III.  DATA  
[W]e have learned that military forces can quickly affect the 
dynamics of the situation and may create the conditions necessary 
to make significant progress in mitigating or resolving underlying 
conflict or dispute. However, we have also learned that many 
aspects of complex emergencies may not be best addressed 
through military measures. 




 This chapter presents data on contingency contracting operations in 
Uzbekistan, as well as data from Heart to Heart and Samaritan's Purse.  The 
chapter presents information on each organization’s structure, training, and 
funding (see Table III-1).  This is followed by a discussion of each organization’s 
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field procurement operations.  A key element of this chapter is a discussion of 
each PVO’s recent activity in Uzbekistan.  After completing this chapter, the 
reader should understand how each humanitarian organization trains, funds, 
plans, and executes the procurement or procurement-related aspects of its 
operations in Uzbekistan. 
 
B. DATA GATHERING METHODS 
My research consists of real-time observations and data from Heart to 
Heart and Samaritan's Purse, as well as data from military contingency 
contracting officers who have supported or are currently supporting Operation 
Enduring Freedom.  Because of information classification, operational security 
concerns, and the chaotic nature of real-time research, there are gaps in the 
data.  Nevertheless, the data presented are as complete and accurate as 
possible, and support useful conclusions.   
The data presented include detailed observations from a ten-day fact 
finding trip with Barbi Moore, Director of International Operations for Heart to 
Heart, during a December 2001 medical airlift to Uzbekistan.  I visited hospitals 
and an orphanage in Samarqand and Tashkent, reviewing Heart to Heart’s 
needs assessment methods.  Moore incorporated me into the airlift, naming me 
as Heart to Heart’s representative during the air shipment of medical supplies to 
Urganch and Nukus.  In this capacity I met with the regional health ministers and 
ensured successful transfer of the aid.   
I conducted multiple in-person and telephone interviews using my primary 
and secondary research questions as a basis for discussion.  Interviews were 
informal with minimal structure, and were not anonymous.  I took notes or made 
recordings, and then transcribed the interviews and submitted them to the 
interviewees via email to check their accuracy.  I also interviewed three military 
contingency contracting officers currently operating in key locations within 
Uzbekistan as well as one officer who has re-deployed from the region.  The 
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officers I interviewed were experienced Army Majors  – three from Army Central 
Command and one from the Special Operations Command.   
Within Heart to Heart and Samaritan's Purse, I interviewed those persons 
managing the finances during field operations and the directors or 
assistant/deputy directors of international humanitarian operations.  Everyone 
interviewed had extensive time overseas.  While in Uzbekistan, I spoke with 
members of six additional PVOs who permanently live in country, Uzbek 
physicians, members of the U.S. Department of State, and the Republic of 
Uzbekistan Minister for Humanitarian Assistance.  I also observed coordination 
meetings between Heart to Heart and U.S. Embassy representatives, Uzbek 
Government officials at the national and regional levels, and Uzbek and Afghan 
businessmen. 
As part of my research, I also reviewed the written policies and training 
practices of Heart to Heart and Samaritan's Purse; Federal, Department of 
Defense, and Army contingency contracting regulations; Department of Defense 
joint publications; and relevant literature – theses, position papers, and studies – 
on civil-military operations and contingency contracting.   
Finally, I presented a draft of this chapter to the representatives of Heart to 
Heart, Samaritan's Purse, and contingency contracting officers interviewed, 
giving them the opportunity to verify the facts presented.  Minor changes were 
offered by them and incorporated into the chapter. 
 
C. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN UZBEKISTAN, OPERATION 
ENDURING FREEDOM  
1. Structure  
Supporting U.S. forces in Uzbekistan is a small group of contingency 
contracting officers.  Because Operation Enduring Freedom is an ongoing 
operation, specific information about the contingency contracting officers is 
omitted.  Typically Majors, the contingency contracting officers are detailed from 
various commands and services throughout the world.  They support multiple 
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locations in Uzbekistan – troop concentrations and population centers –
purchasing supplies and contracting for services.  The contingency contracting 
officers are attached to the top echelon of command, as applicable, in their 
region.  All contingency contracting activities are conducted in accordance with 
Federal, Department of Defense, and Department of the Army Acquisition 
Regulations. 
2. Training Contingency Contracting Officers  
The contingency contracting officers interviewed for this thesis are all fully 
certified and warranted to execute contingency contracting operations.  In 
addition to training in contracting according to the Defense Workforce 
Improvement Act, including a two-week course on contingency contracting, the 
contracting officers interviewed have prior contingency contracting experience in 
other regions and deployments. 
3. Funding a Stability Operation 
In accordance with Federal and Defense Acquisition Regulations, 
contingency contracting officers cannot obligate funds until a funds certification 
officer certifies purchase requests.  Contracting officers are prohibited from 
purchasing or contracting without sufficient funds.  The funds certification officer 
must verify the availability of appropriate funds or will certify bulk funding for 
multiple purchases.  The bulk  funding procedure gives the contingency 
contracting officer authorization from the certifying officer to obligate funds on 
purchase documents against a specified lump-sum reserved for that purpose 
over a specified period of time.  Rather than obtaining individual obligation 
authority on each purchase document, funds are pre-committed.  [Ref. 9]  Bulk 
funds are being used in Uzbekistan for Operation Enduring Freedom, but at the 
time of authorship funding totals remain classified. 
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4. Executing Contingency Contracting Operations 
a. Field Procurement  
Perishable foods are shipped into Uzbekistan from bases in the 
Republic of Turkey.  In-country purchases focus on consumable supplies, water, 
tents, generators, and unique equipment for the deployed forces.  More than 100 
Uzbeks under contract perform on-base services including portable latrine 
cleaning, food preparation, laundry service, trash removal, and linguist support.  
Additionally, small construction services such as construction of temporary 
buildings, more than 4000 truckloads of gravel, and labor to fill sandbags are 
contracted for.  Future construction contracts for a basketball courts and athletic 
facilities are in negotiation.  As of March 2002, approximately 500 contracts and 
700 Purchase Requests have been written obligating several million dollars.  
Civilian contractors will take over many services in the near future.  Very little 
procurement has been made using undefinitized (informal, incomplete) 
agreements.  [Ref. 32, 55] 
The host nation initially provided a bidders list, which the 
contingency contracting officers have expanded through their own market 
research.  By mid-March 2002, the contingency contracting office had 
established a bid board to publicize needs; prior to this, word of mouth and 
bidder’s lists were primary means of publicizing needs.  The contingency 
contracting officers have not used the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) 
as a conduit to the local nationals unless a problem with an individual occurs.  
Problems are rare. 
b. Purchase Price Variations 
Different contingency contracting officers reported different 
observations on price changes.  One contingency contracting officer noticed a 
drop in prices paid over his four months in Uzbekistan.  He attributed this drop to 
an improved ability to negotiate after developing a better understanding of the 
market and local cultural negotiating methods.  Another contingency contracting 
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officer noticed a small decrease in construction contract prices due to increased 
competition between host nation contractors.  [Ref. 32] 
c. Limited Market Information  
The contingency contracting officers interviewed indicated a desire 
for more market information during the initial stages of deployment.  One officer 
noted that better information on the local vendor base and the capabilities of 
various construction contractors would have resulted in better contingency 
contracting early on.  Contractors initially hired from the bidder’s list provided by 
the host nation had difficulty performing the services contracted for.  They were 
unaware of U.S. standards of quality, performance, and lacked the skills needed 
to execute the terms of the contract.  They required close supervision and 
training by the Contracting Officer’s Representative to produce satisfactory 
results.  A contingency contracting officer noted, “Contingency contracting 
officers need to realize that there will be growing pains.  We must be flexible and 
try to adhere to U.S. standards as much as possible.”  [Ref. 32] 
Market research and trial and error has since shown which 
contractors can best perform specific services, and contracts are awarded with 
this knowledge as a factor in selection criteria.  The bid board, market research, 
and word of mouth have increased the vendor base since the deployment began.  
The U.S. Embassy’s purchasing officials frequently assisted with catalog 
purchases and identifying suppliers, but due to the unique purchasing 
requirements of a military force, sometimes these officials could not provide the 
market or vendor information needed to support the contingency contracting 
officers.  [Ref. 32]   
An example of the need for increased market research is 
demonstrated with the requirement for cellular phone service.  Communication is 
essential to contingency contracting, and  upon arrival, establishing cellular 
service was a top priority.  There are several firms providing cellular service in 
Uzbekistan.  Initially, cellular phones were purchased through Uzdron-Rubita.  
The contingency contracting officers soon discovered that Unitel provided a wider 
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coverage area, and hence switched to this firm.  Better market research could 
have identified this prior to solicitation and award.  [Ref. 32] 
5. Networking with Organizations in Uzbekistan  
None of the contingency contracting officers have interacted with PVO 
procurement personnel during their five-month deployment.  They are not, 
however, opposed to interaction and information exchanges with PVOs.  One 
contingency contracting officer supporting PVO interaction said,  
When we go in, we go in cold … it’s important to have someone 
who has walked the ground.  It would be better to cooperate than 
compete [with humanitarian organizations].  [Ref. 32] 
Another contingency contracting officer commented that although he would 
welcome interaction with PVOs, his experiences in Bosnia-Hercegovina led him 
to believe that many NGOs/PVOs avoid interaction with the military.   
A third contingency contracting officer has interacted with procurement 
personnel from the media.  He characterized media buyers as “not procurement 
savvy” and unconcerned about their expenditures.  This contingency contracting 
officer said that journalists were paying $125 per day for translators, while he 
was contracting translators for $600 per month.  Communication between the 
media buyers and the contingency contracting officer provided the media 
additional market information they could use to negotiate lower prices.  [Ref. 32] 
 
D. SAMARITAN’S PURSE 
As mentioned earlier, Samaritan's Purse is a nondenominational, 
evangelical Christian private volunteer organization.  In 2000, the PVO provided 
more than $113 million in aid to 115 nations  [Ref. 33].  This year, Samaritan's 
Purse has begun refurbishing schools and rebuilding the hospital in Kholm, 
northwestern Afghanistan.  Samaritan's Purse also has a medical team in 
Afghanistan training nurses to work in the completed Kholm hospital as well as 
respond to the March 2002 earthquake in Nahrin.  Samaritan's Purse’s Afghan 
operations staged from Uzbekistan.  [Ref. 33] 
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Another major mission of Samaritan's Purse is Operation Christmas Child.  
Operation Christmas Child manages the solicitation, collection, inspection, 
consolidation, and shipment of millions of shoeboxes filled with donated 
Christmas gifts for distribution to children in poverty.   In December 2001, 
Samaritan’s Purse delivered 34,702 shoeboxes for Uzbek children.  [Ref. 33]   
Samaritan’s Purse is committed to both short and long term operations 
and would best be categorized by RAND PVO classification system as a Core-
Team organization because of its large size, robust organizational structure, and 
willingness to cooperate with International Organizations and the military.  As an 
example of its sound reputation, the UN gave Samaritan's Purse lead agency 
status in Kosovo to orchestrate the housing reconstruction activities of all 
NGOs/PVOs.  Samaritan's Purse held meetings for all the NGOs in the region, 
coordinating home reconstruction sites, ensuring NGOs responded to all the 
needs in country, parceling out regions for response, minimizing overlap, and 
managing allocation of resources.  These coordination meetings were informal, 
with NGOs networking together to identify and respond to needs.  [Ref. 34] 
1. Structure  
Samaritan's Purse’s International Headquarters in Boone, North Carolina, 
is staffed with more than 300 personnel.  Samaritan's Purse also maintains 
offices in Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Australia.  
Samaritan's Purse has six Vice Presidents who report to the President and Chief 
Executive Officer, Franklin Graham.  The Vice President of Ministries oversees 
the operational arm of Samaritan's Purse (see Figure III-1).  Under him are two 
distinct departments: Projects and Operation Christmas Child.  The Projects 
department is further subdivided into regional directorships responsible for 
humanitarian operations within a geographic region of the world.  Project 
Administrators, who manage all aspect of a project, report to the regional 
directors.  Country coordinators execute long or short duration missions on the 
ground under the supervision of Project Administrators.  The Operation 
Christmas Child staff coordinates airlifts independently from the Projects office, 





Figure III-1  Samaritan's Purse Organizational Framework 
 
2.  Training – On the Job   
Samaritan's Purse has a detailed field policy manual in draft form.  
Intended as a guide for the country coordinator, it covers all aspects of field 
operations including procurement authority, ethics, and financial reporting without 
setting spending limits.  In spite of its detail, it is not an impediment to the 
coordinator’s ability to use funds as necessary to respond to the crisis.  [Ref. 35] 
Country coordinators are brought up “through the ranks.”  Members of 
relief missions gain experience and are given additional responsibility as they 
deploy on more and more missions.  When a volunteer’s skills demonstrate an 
ability to lead a project, volunteers are selected as coordinators.  A coordinator is 
usually a part time member of Samaritan's Purse, paid during his or her service, 
which is typically about six months.  coordinators are given authority over all 
aspects of the operation in country, including procurement.  For short-term 
operations, the coordinator maintains, spends, and accounts for the funds 
independently.  During long-term operations, coordinators retain this authority, 































a. Sources of Funds   
This PVO receives, on average, 40% cash donations and 60% 
donated goods and services [Ref 24].  Samaritan's Purse also competes for and 
receives grants from USAID for specific projects [Ref 34].  Administrative 
expenses consume about nine percent of donations annually [Ref 24].  Funding 
levels at the beginning of a new project are unknown; as public awareness of the 
crisis increases, however, contributions increase to fund the project.  Donors 
have the opportunity to earmark contributions for general categories of support, 
such as children’s projects, emergency disaster response, or Afghan relief.  All 
donations are carefully classified by category, and are considered restricted 
funds.  Funds restricted for a specific purpose are placed under the discretion of 
the coordinator of that operation.  If more funds are donated to a project than are 
spent, Samaritan's Purse redirects these funds toward a similar project.  [Ref. 35] 
b. Fiscal Responsibility   
The dependence on donations makes Samaritan's Purse very 
conscious of the importance of wisely spending every dollar, transparency of the 
finances, and feedback to the donors about how dollars were spent.  Any 
perceived impropriety could hurt Samaritan's Purse’s ability to obtain future 
donations and grants.  Jacqueline Blevins, Field Accounting Manager for 
Samaritan's Purse, commented on the importance of sound financial 
accountability: 
Samaritan’s Purse policy is to use funds as the donor indicates.  
We are accountable to God first and then to the donor, whether 
individual or Government grant, etc.  We have been diligent in 
establishing a reputation of credibility and accountability to use 
funds as requested and report the activity back to the donor.  [Ref 
34] 
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4. Field Operations 
a. Establishing a New Project 
Emergency Response efforts at Samaritan’s Purse are coordinated 
through the Projects Department.  Within the 40-person Projects Department are 
Project Administrators and Program Directors who supervise individual projects – 
a flood, famine, refugee problem, etc.  Once a crisis is identified, Samaritan's 
Purse sends in a survey team of two or three staff members to determine the 
need, usually including a physician and an administrator.  The team carries 
between $10,000 – 20,000 in cash to pay for initial expenses (more for better 
developed countries).   
Because only organizations registered with the host nation can 
open bank accounts, once on site the survey team attempts to partner with an 
existing organization operating in the region to use their bank account as a 
conduit for additional funds.  If partnering occurs, Samaritan's Purse funds are 
deposited into the other PVO’s account in the U.S. for transfer to their bank in the 
host nation.  The PVO partner’s representative in country withdraws Samaritan's 
Purse’s funds from the account and passes them to the Samaritan's Purse 
coordinator.  [Ref. 25] 
If the survey team determines a project should be established, the 
team leader typically becomes the country coordinator until a permanent 
replacement is identified.  [Ref. 25] 
b.  Networking with other PVOs  
Networking is key to establishing new operation for Samaritan's 
Purse.  Prior to departure the survey team contacts organizations (churches, 
NGOs, and other contacts) known to be operating in the area to gain situationa l 
information and establish assistance links.  The survey team makes additional 
contacts as soon as they arrive in country.  The team looks for like-minded 
organizations with similar goals.  For short duration missions, the team tries to 
plug Samaritan's Purse into that organization’s operations to funnel relief through 
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them to accomplish Samaritan's Purse’s goals; this can be via cash or goods.  
[Ref. 36] 
Other PVOs/NGOs provide critical information to the survey team, 
including information on pricing and wages, sources of supply, and sources of 
services.  These organizations also supply information about locales needing 
help, PVO/NGO coverage, and security threats.  As noted earlier, PVO field 
procurement personnel consult with other organizations before choosing 
suppliers, receiving recommendations on price, quality, and trust.  Where 
possible, two or three suppliers recommended by other organizations are 
consulted for pricing information prior to purchase.  Samaritan's Purse 
sometimes finds itself in competition with other NGOs for resources in country.  
Competition is resolved through networking with competing organizations to 
improve resource allocation.  Samaritan's Purse will sometimes partially fund the 
competitor’s program to gain access to the resource.  [Ref. 34] 
c.  Military Cooperation 
Samaritan's Purse supports military cooperation.  Mr. Gary 
Lundstrom, Deputy Director of Operation Christmas Child, believes close 
cooperation with the U.S. military can improve airlift execution.  He worked with 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s force in Kosovo, (KFOR) to deliver more 
than 400,000 gift boxes to Kosovar children and cited it as an example of 
cooperation.   
Lundstrom coordinated with the military for use of airspace, landed 
at the KFOR airbase in Skopje, and planned for offload assistance by KFOR.  
The airlift was nearly cancelled by the military one day prior to execution because 
KFOR was in a deployment phase and did not want to delay the inflow of soldiers 
into the region.  The threat of negative press kept the airlift on schedule.  
Samaritan's Purse landed, offloaded, and departed the aircraft in four hours to 
keep from interfering with the deployment schedule.  Key to this success was a 
local national Macedonian working for Samaritan's Purse who knew of local firms 
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with trucks and forklifts to support offload and transport.  Lundstrom coordinated 
offload and transport in less than 24 hours.  [Ref. 37] 
Lundstrom believes North American-based NGOs are generally 
much more receptive to cooperating with the military that International NGOs.  
He agrees with RAND’s report on NGOs and PVOs, commenting that 
international NGOs believe there is a stigma that accompanies an association 
with the U.S. military.  In a January 2002 international NGO/PVO meeting in 
Kholm, Afghanistan, Lundstrom was pressured to leave because he appeared to 
be U.S. military.  Participants, while looking directly at him, stated that 
representatives from the military were not wanted in the meeting.  After the 
meeting ended, other attendees approached Lundstrom to ascertain for whom he 
worked and whether he had military connections, believing he was only 
pretending to represent a PVO.  [Ref. 37] 
Confirming the Center for Naval Analyses study, Lundstrom 
believes when the military enters an area, PVOs experience price hikes because 
contingency contracting officers are unaware of market prices in the region.  
Specifically, he has observed that the price for renting a car, or the wages of 
translators and drivers goes up 10 to 25 percent on average when the military 
enters the area.  He feels this would not happen as often if military contingency 
contracting officers exchanged information on pricing with NGO buyers.  [Ref. 37] 
Mr. Lundstrom’s observations were echoed by Thomas Hoggard III,  
a physician volunteering through the PVO Northwest Medical.  A veteran PVO 
physician of Desert Storm and Somalia, now serving in Mazar i Shariff, 
Afghanistan, Dr. Hoggard also believes international organizations are biased 
against the U.S. military, tha t American PVOs are generally more favorable 
toward the military, and that resource competition between the armed forces and 
NGOs/PVOs occurs in complex contingency operations, inflating prices.  [Ref. 
38] 
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d. Field Finances 
When a long-term operation is established, Samaritan's Purse will 
register with the host nation and open a bank account.  In rare cases, the 
economic and financial situation prohibits setting up a bank account in country, 
and cash must be wired to a neighboring country and “ferried” in.  A bookkeeper 
is hired, typically a local national or more likely an ex-pat (U.S. or Canadian 
citizen living abroad), who is trained in Samaritan's Purse’s accounting 
procedures by an accountant dispatched from the Headquarters in Boone, North 
Carolina.  The country coordinator carefully manages funds with the assistance 
of the bookkeeper.  The bookkeeper tracks expenditures, reports fund 
consumption almost daily, and formally submits detailed expenditure reports 
monthly to the accounting staff in Boone.  Funds are transferred into the country 
coordinator’s operating account periodically – usually on a weekly basis – but 
always with a focus on planned financial needs for the coming weeks.  [Ref. 35] 
e. Field Procurement 
Initially, as much as 95% of all procurement is based on cash 
purchases and oral agreements, with the remainder being undefinitized 
agreements and purchase orders.  Once field operations stabilize and an office is 
established, cash transactions and purchase orders become the key means of 
procuring goods and services (approximately 75%) with oral agreements 
dropping to 25%.  Formal, written contracts are rarely entered into.  Samaritan's 
Purse checks two to three local vendors recommended by other NGOs before 
making purchases.  [Ref. 34] 
Even during long-term projects, formal contracts are infrequent.  
Most needs are procured using purchase orders.  In Kosovo and Albania, an 
Albanian contractor was hired for refugee camp construction.  The contractor 
was hired via letter contract, agreeing to materials costs and labor costs he 
submitted, but without formal terms and conditions.  The contractor –  referred to 
Samaritan's Purse via another PVO –  satisfied the requirements.  [Ref.34] 
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The goods and services procured vary from project to project.  For 
short duration projects, such as an Operation Christmas Child airlift, all that may 
be required is meals and lodging.  More frequently, freight handling assets and 
linguist support are needed as well.  For long-term missions, the needs are 
varied.  Natural disasters and refugee crises need large quantities of consumable 
supplies like plastic for temporary shelters, basic medical supplies, food, and 
water.  Other projects, like school or hospital construction or renovation, rely 
heavily on construction materials and equipment.  [Ref. 35] 
Field purchasing authority lies with the country coordinator.  If the 
restricted funds are available, the coordinator believes the need is emergent, and 
the purchase is within very general guidelines established by the headquarters, 
the coordinator can make purchases without approval from Boone, North 
Carolina.   
Purchasing guidelines set by Samaritan's Purse vary based on the 
mission and the experience level of the country coordinator.  Major purchases 
that are not time sensitive – for example a March 2002 $340,000 purchase of 
tractors for farmers in the Ukraine – are passed through Samaritan's Purse 
headquarters for approval.  There is no standard limit for the amount 
coordinators can spend or the types of goods and services procured.  Rather 
than manage field purchasing from the Headquarters, Samaritan's Purse prefers 
to manage its coordinators, placing personnel that are more experienced on 
larger projects that incur greater expenditures.  Don Norrington, Assistant 
Director of Projects, likened the field operating environment to military leadership 
in combat: 
When under hostile fire, the commander on the ground needs to 
make decisions now, without the approval of headquarters.  Our 
staff operating in Afghanistan responded to the [25 March, 2002] 
earthquake within hours, acquiring supplies and transporting them 
to Nahrin.  They received instructions from the Boone office to 
move into the Nahrin area, but they determined how to best 
respond to the needs once they were on site and did so without 
seeking specific approval.  [Ref. 35] 
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5.  Operation Christmas Child’s Airlift to Uzbekistan  
December 2001 was the third year that Samaritan's Purse sent Christmas 
gift boxes to Uzbekistan.  Sixty-five thousand shoeboxes were shipped through 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan on an Antonov AN-124-100 – the world’s largest cargo 
aircraft – contracted through a Russian firm, Volga-Dnepr Airlines.  Thirty-four 
thousand shoeboxes were distributed to children in Uzbekistan.  An additional 
thirty-one thousand were ground transported from Topoyich Airbase, Uzbekistan, 
through Tajikistan, and into Afghanistan.  [Ref. 37] 
Samaritan's Purse worked through World Concern – a Canadian PVO 
registered with Uzbekistan  – as their in-country airlift coordinator.  Registered 
 
Figure III- 1  Three Afghan boys among 65,000 children in Central Asia 
receiving gifts in DEC 2001. From: Samaritan's Purse Media File 
 
PVO members receive identification cards from the Government.  These 
credentials  give PVOs quasi-diplomatic status, enabling PVOs to gain access to 
Government offices, move freely about the country without registering as tourists 
must do, and serve as an in-country identification that draws less attention than 
passports [Ref. 39].   
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Mr. Gary Lundstrom, Deputy Director of Operation Christmas Child, 
conducted much of Samaritan's Purse’s coordination with the Uzbek 
Government.  During negotiations, Government officials pressured Mr. 
Lundstrom to use Uzbekistan Airways (Uzbek Air) to ship the cargo.  Uzbek Air is 
the Government-owned airline of Uzbekistan, with exclusive control of airports in 
country.  Few flights from other airlines are permitted to land in Tashkent.  
Lundstrom explained that the contract with Volga-Dnepr had already been let and 
a breach of contract would be costly.  Additionally, there was media attention in 
the U.S. about the donations, including media reports about World Trade Center 
victims’ families and New York City firefighters collecting gifts for Afghan children.   
Even though the Uzbek Government was pleasant, it was unyielding.  The 
Antonov 124 took off from Kennedy Airport, New York, with no Uzbekistan air 
clearance or place to land.  Only then did the Government agree to allow flight 
without use of the Government-run Airline.  Mr. Lundstrom believes the 
Government was willing to do anything they could to convince Samaritan's Purse 
to use Uzbek Air that would not jeopardize the receipt of the aid.  [Ref. 37] 
 
E. HEART TO HEART INTERNATIONAL  
Heart to Heart is a relief and development PVO dedicated to encouraging 
volunteerism and mobilizing resources to provide assistance worldwide.  Since 
their first mission to Uzbekistan in 1997, Heart to Heart International has 
delivered more than $14 million (wholesale value) of medical aid to Uzbek 
hospitals and clinics [Ref. 20].  Applying RAND’s PVO classification system, 
Heart to Heart is a Specialized Organization, focusing on high-impact, short 
duration infusions of food and medical supplies via airlift or sealift, and medical 
training.   
In December 2001, Heart to Heart delivered $2.3 million of medical aid to 
three regions of Uzbekistan – Urganch, Nukus, and Andijon – and conducted 
assessments to prepare for a major airlift in mid-2002 of pharmaceuticals and 

































1. Structure  
Humanitarian operations at Heart to Heart are managed from two primary 
positions, the Vice President for International Programs and the Vice President 
for Domestic Programs.  Both report to the Executive Vice President, John North.  
Resource coordination and support functions are handled through the 
administrative directors and coordinators, including the receipt of donated goods, 
warehousing, palletizing, and preparation for shipment.  Heart to Heart maintains 
only one office outside the United States.  Located in Beijing, the Asian office 
focuses primarily on medical training and assistance to China.  Reporting to the 
International and Domestic Vice Presidents are seven project/development 
coordinators and three assistants responsible for planning and executing 
humanitarian missions.   
 
 
Figure III-3  Heart to Heart, International Organizational Structure   
2. Training – On the Job 
No written procedures exist at Heart to Heart to guide project managers’ 
procurement during a mission.  Mrs. Moore personally trains each project 
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manager by bringing them with her on missions and teaching them her methods 
– essentially an apprenticeship.  Mrs. Moore gradually adds responsibilities to the 
apprentice project manager until she believes the person is trained well enough 
to handle smaller projects on his/her own.  A project manager takes on larger 
projects as his/her skills improve. 
Heart to Heart’s International Programs office has a draft of its planning 
guidance that covers mission selection, approval, and airlift planning, and 
networking.  No completion date is set for this document.  A future goal of the 
International Programs office is to fully document the techniques and procedures 
of project management, airlift coordination, and airlift execution.  [Ref. 22] 
3. Funding  
Since its inception in 1992, Heart to Heart has delivered more than $210 
million dollars in aid to more than 50 countries.  Aid missions are financed 
through donations of money, goods, and services.  Private and corporate donors 
contribute over $1.5 million annually, of which Heart to Heart consumes only 
2.4% for operating expenses.  Corporations donate  food, medical supplies, 
pharmaceuticals, and services.  Federal Express Corporation, for example, has 
shipped cargo at no charge for numerous airlifts.  Heart to Heart leverages every 
donated dollar into $25 worth of medicines and supplies by using monetary 
donations to solicit, process, and ship donations of goods and services from 
corporate donors.  [Ref. 19] 
Heart to Heart International is also partnered with the United States 
Department of State (DoS).  Heart to Heart receives grants from the State 
Department’s Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the Newly 
Independent States (S/NIS-C) to provide aid to the nations that broke away from 
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.  As part of this agreement, the DoS 
recommends areas needing assistance.  If the need meets Heart to Heart’s 
criteria, it will coordinate a mission to that region.  The State Department’s S/NIS -
C contracts for aid shipment at no cost to the PVO.  [Ref. 22] 
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4. Heart to Heart International Field Operations  
a. Mission Selection and Approval  
Heart to Heart International selects missions from requests 
submitted by the State Department, partner organizations such as the American 
Academy of Family Physicians, foreign countries, other PVOs, private 
individuals, and the Heart to Heart International Board and Staff members.  Barbi 
Moore, Senior Vice President of international Programs, reviews each request 
and presents qualifying requests to the Executive Staff for approval.  Requests 
are approved if: 
· The request is in line with Heart to Heart International’s mission; 
· The resources are available or can be procured; 
· The timeline for the project fits into the organization’s scheduled 
commitments; 
· The project meets a genuine need in the region; 
· There is a responsible, verifiable means to distribute the aid [Ref. 40].  
 
b. Networking with other PVOs - Initial 
Once a project is approved, Mrs. Moore assigns a member of the 
International Programs staff to lead the project.  This project manager is 
responsible for all aspects of the mission, including spending and accounting for 
the funds.  On very large projects involving 50 – 70 physicians and support 
personnel, a separate staff member is sometimes selected to handle 
procurement, moving to new locations two or three days in advance of the 
medical team to arrange hotels, coordinate for meals, and arrange transportation.  
When assigned, the project manager immediately begins networking to obtain 
information and support, including: 
· Conducting internet research to collect maps, health, economic, 
political, travel, customs, holidays, appropriate business practices, and 
consular data; 
· Identifying established contacts in the region; 
· Locating known U.S. citizens in the region; 
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· Locating NGOs/PVOs already operating in the region and assessing 
their focus/mission; 
· Identifying U.S. donor firms operating in the region. 
 
The initial networking goal is to determine the appropriate response 
to the need and prepare to “enter the country already generally familiar with the 
appropriate behavior, economic and political situation, needs, and the 
international community.” [Ref. 40]   A key task of networking is to determine the 
people in the region that exercise the influence necessary to support the relief 
mission.  Prior to departure to the region for an assessment, the project manager 
coordinates meetings with in-country contacts including foreign government 
officials like the Ministers of Health, Foreign Affairs, and Humanitarian 
Assistance, U.S. Government officials at the Embassy and U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), locally operating PVOs, potential recipient 
institutions, and potential local coordinators.  Local coordinators are volunteers in 
the region who assist with preparation, execution, and monitoring of aid.  [Ref. 
22] 
c. Networking with other PVOs – In Country 
After initial coordination, the project manager leads an assessment 
team to the location to fully evaluate the need, then requests a relief package 
tailored to the region.  The assessment team uses established contacts in 
country to leverage its operation.  In-country contacts established during 
networking provide essential information and assistance, including identification 
of critical needs, communications support, documentation processing, customs, 
freight forwarding and livery, storage, distribution, and monitoring.  Where a 
supportive network exists, deployment of an assessment team from the U.S. may 
not be necessary: in-country contacts perform the initial assessment, conserving 
PVO funds and effort.  In Uzbekistan, Heart to Heart International’s primary 
contact and local coordinator is Michael Timcke, of the Project on Economic 
Reforms in Central Asia (PERDCA).  Timcke provides and arranges services for  
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Figure III- 2 Heart to Heart's Coordination Network in Uzbekistan 
 
Moore including customs document processing, transportation, currency 
exchange, minor purchases, and linguist support.  Because of his fluency in both 
Russian and Uzbek languages, and his years of experience in Uzbekistan, Mrs. 
Moore makes no decisions concerning Heart to Heart operations in Uzbekistan 
without first consulting with him.  In addition to Mr. Timcke and the PERDCA 
staff, Heart to Heart International has established numerous other contacts in 
Uzbekistan, as depicted by figure III-3.  
Barbi Moore believes her organization’s operations have many 
parallels with military stability operations with respect to establishing initial 
operations.  In an interview with her in Tashkent, Mrs. Moore said  
Heart to Heart in many ways is like the military coming into a 
country, because we don’t have offices and we don’t have contacts.  
In every country Heart to Heart has to find the local people – so 
often it’s ex-pats [U.S. citizens working abroad] that understand an 
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American mindset and how our donors are going to expect a 
project to flow.  They know where to find resources, hot spots, what 
to avoid, and also what’s going to be important to the local people.  
In Uzbekistan, it’s Michael Timcke of PERDCA, it’s Erik Schenkel 
[Central Asian–American Partnership for Academic Development] 
that know the lay of the land.  They know where to find transport 
and how to interface with the Cabinet of Ministers. 
We must find that network in any country.  First, I go to the [U.S.] 
Embassy to find what NGOs are on the ground.  I meet with the 
Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission, USAID, and other relief 
agencies.  I look for NGOs I’ve worked with before to get introduced 
into the NGO community and find a link into the Government.  [Ref. 
22] 
 
Mrs. Moore’s comments echo JP 3-08’s recommendation to joint 
task forces to connect with PVOs and NGOs long established in country to 
collect information, make contacts with Government officials, and tap into 
available resources.  Heart to Heart’s Senior Vice President of International 
Operations believes networking with other PVOs has great value, and she has 
adopted this as her key strategy for establishing a foothold in new countries. 
d. Military Cooperation 
Heart to Heart, International and Moore support coordination with 
the military.  While in Uzbekistan, with the encouragement of a U.S. Embassy 
official, she attempted to contact military officials to coordinate future joint 
humanitarian operations in the Karshi region.  High military operational tempo 
during December 2001, coupled with Moore’s tight schedule, prevented 
coordination, however. 
e. Field Procurement 
During an aid mission, the project manager generally travels with 
cash in U.S. dollars until arrival in country, and then converts it to local currency.  
Frequently, there is also a demand for dollars and some transactions are carried 
out in dollars.  Customs laws typically limit the amount of cash that can be carried 
by one person to $10,000 USD, so on major missions involving 50 – 70 
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physicians Heart to Heart will divide carried cash among the senior staff 
members to clear customs.   
Heart to Heart engages only in small purchases during airlifts.  
Major expenses are rarely incurred due to the nature of their specialized 
humanitarian assistance.  Shipping costs are contracted for by the DoS or 
donated by Federal Express.  The host nation Government typically arranges for 
download of aid from aircraft to trucks for ground transport to hospitals and 
clinics.  Heart to Heart commonly incurs expenses for support services, including 
lodging, meals, communications support (email, fax, cellular phone service), and 
air or ground transportation of personnel.  Heart to Heart may also purchase 
large quantities of needed foodstuffs in the region to avoid transport costs.  For 
example, in December 2001, Moore was working with Uzbek and Afghan 
businessmen to purchase wheat and sugar for distribution to Afghan families in 
need. 
The project manager attempts to coordinate most support services 
during the advance party visit/assessment several weeks prior to the arrival of a 
major airlift accompanied by dozens of physicians.  Mrs. Maya Eskridge, 
International Programs Project Director for Heart to Heart and frequently the 
project manager or financial manager for major humanitarian missions, 
characterized the procurement during airlifts as a combination of oral 
agreements, undefinitized agreements (letter contracts), and indefinite 
delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) purchase orders.  According to Mrs. Eskridge, 
approximately 40% of all her procurement actions in foreign nations are based on 
oral agreements, although she notes that as technology continues to penetrate 
developing nations, this percentage steadily decreases.  A typical oral agreement 
would be a promise by a restaurant to provide 50 meals for Heart to Heart 
physicians on a certain date for a set price.  The remainder of her purchasing is 
categorized as letter contracts and ID/IQ purchase orders.  Examples include a 
fax or email from a hotel agreeing to provide an approximate quantity of rooms 
for a set rate for set period, or, an agreement to provide buses to transport 
physicians at a pre-arranged rate.  [Ref. 41] 
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Negotiations are typically limited to discounts.  Volume discounts of 
an average of 25% are typically obtained for lodging, sometimes increasing to 
50% for larger hotels with excess capacity.  For most goods and services, project 
managers rely primarily upon informal market research – little more than price 
and quality judgments – during the assessment and the information collected via 
networking to determine what the market rate is for services.  [Ref. 41] 
5. December 2001 Airlift to Uzbekistan 
In December 2001, Heart to Heart delivered $2.3 million of medical aid to 
three regions of Uzbekistan at the request of the State Department’s S/NIS -C 
office.  The DoS Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the Newly 
Independent States requested that where applicable, assistance be directed 
toward Uzbekistan as a gesture of goodwill in response to their support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom.  Heart to Heart collected donations of prescription 
medications, over-the-counter medications, and consumable medical supplies 
and palletized them at their Kansas warehouse for distribution in Uzbekistan.  
Copies of the manifests and air waybills (a document detailing the means of 
shipment, route, and charges) were forwarded to Heart to Heart’s local 
coordinator – PERDCA – for coordination with Uzbek customs officials and the 
Minister of Humanitarian Assistance.  The S/NIS-C submitted a request for bid 
for shipment of the pallets to Uzbekistan.  The requirements were to ship 25 
pallets from Kansas via New York City and Luxembourg City to Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan, with distribution via two aircraft to the regional centers of Urganch, 
Nukus, and Andijon.  Panalpina, Incorporated won the bid at $107,000 USD.   
a. Airlift Coordination 
Mrs. Moore, already very familiar with the processes and players 
necessary to coordinate an airlift in Uzbekistan, coordinated the execution of the 
airlift with PERDCA via fax and email.  A small operation at 25 pallets, she 
determined she could execute the operation without additional support staff.  The 
PERDCA team would be in country with transportation, communication, and 
linguist support.  The Senior Vice President also scheduled visits with other 
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PVOs and ex-pats friendly to Heart to Heart and planned assessments of regions 
for a follow-on mission.  The PERDCA staff processed the manifests and waybills 
through the Uzbek bureaucracy.  
Upon arrival, Mrs. Moore met with Michael Timcke, PERDCA 
manager for Uzbekistan and local coordinator for Heart to Heart.  He immediately 
supplied Moore with a cellular phone for use in Uzbekistan.  Based on his 
experience with cellular providers, Mr. Timcke purchased service with the widest 
area coverage, knowing Moore would be traveling throughout Uzbekistan.  She 
confirmed her schedule, and with PERDCA’s assistance oversaw the preparation 
of documentation necessary to process the shipment.  She met with Dr. Alisher 
Sharipov, Minister for Humanitarian Assistance, of the Uzbek Cabinet of 
Ministers, who brokered a host nation agreement between Heart to Heart and the 
Uzbekistan Government addressing host nation support of Heart to Heart’s relief 
operations including customs waivers and ground transportation.  Mrs. Moore 
also met with John Post, Deputy Director of the S/NIS-C office, who was in 
Uzbekistan to coordinate a summer relief operation. 
b. Additional Coordination  
In addition to supervising the airlift, during Mrs. Moore’s eight-day 
mission to Uzbekistan she conducted additional business and coordination, 
including: 
· Assessments of clinics and hospitals in Samarqand to determine 
medical needs; 
· Discussions with Samarqand’s regional health director, airport director, 
and both air and ground customs agents to prepare for a Spring 2002 
airlift; 
· Visits with ex-pat physicians supporting Heart to Heart operations; 
· Delivery of sweaters to an orphanage supported by a partner PVO; 
· Discussions with the Minister for Humanitarian Aid on medical needs in 
Uzbekistan; 
· Discussions with the Deputy Director, S/NIS -C, U.S. State Department, 
to plan a future DoS-funded mission to Uzbekistan; 
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· Discussions with Uzbek Health Officials concerning establishment of a 
national blood supply system; 
· Discussions with an Afghan businessman to establish contacts and 
support for future operations in Mazar i Sharif; 
· Host of an appreciation luncheon for PVOs and Government officials 
supporting Heart to Heart operations in Uzbekistan. 
 
c. Sub-Contractor Problems and Privity of Contract   
Early in the trip, a snag developed with the airlift.  Mrs. Moore had 
not heard from Panalpina, the freight forwarding company, to finalize details of 
the shipment’s arrival at Tashkent and subsequent distribution.  The shipment 
was contracted for a firm fixed price of $107,000.00 with Panalpina, but at the 
request of the Uzbek Government, the State Department asked Panalpina to use 
Uzbekistan Airways (Uzbek Air) as a subcontractor for the shipment.  The attacks 
of September 11th, 2001 had hurt Uzbek Air’s profitability, and as a nationalized 
firm, the Government of Uzbekistan had asked for this consideration.  Given 
Uzbekistan’s cooperation with Operation Enduring Freedom, the DoS wanted to 
be helpful [Ref. 42].   
Panalpina did in fact subcontract for $76,000.00 with Uzbek Air for 
shipment of the aid from Luxembourg to Tashkent, and subsequent distribution 
by air to three regions of Uzbekistan using two aircraft.  Uzbek Air has a 
requirement that all its cargo operations be coordinated through a European 
affiliate, Cargo Net.  Two days prior to the shipment, Cargo Net and Uzbek Air 
attempted to leverage their role in the shipment.  Demands included a delay of 
the flight by one day, an additional $20,000.00, additional cargo placed on board 
(prohibited in the original contract), shipment from Zurich or Bonn instead of 
Luxembourg, and the use of one aircraft instead of two.   
Panalpina, Heart to Heart, and State Department representatives 
met daily – sometimes twice daily – with Uzbek Air.  With each meeting, some of 
the contract issues were resolved, but between meetings Uzbek Air submitted 
new demands.  The Commercial Cargo Director for Uzbek Air at Headquarters in 
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Tashkent, with whom negotiations were conducted, blamed Cargo Net for the 
changes and said the exclusive shipping agreement with Cargo Net tied his 
hands.   
The State Department, as the owner of the contract for Heart to 
Heart’s shipment, entered direct discussions with Uzbek Air, breaching privity of 
contract, but forcing Uzbek Air to meet the critical terms of the agreement – price 
and number of aircraft.  Privity of contract refers to the direct relationship that 
exists between contracting parties.  The Government signs a contract with one 
contractor – the prime contractor; therefore, there is privity of contract between 
the Government and the prime contractor (Panalpina).  However, the 
Government does not sign a contract with any subcontractor, so no privity of 
contract exists (Uzbek Air).  Since no privity exists, the Government cannot 
negotiate directly with the subcontractor or direct the subcontractor to take any 
action.   
After four days of heated discussions, the issues were resolved.  
The flight was delayed one day forcing the aid to be distributed during a three-
day holiday commemorating the end of Ramadan and causing a last minute 
change to the U.S. Ambassador’s scheduled ceremony.  Other concessions 
included additional cargo placed on the aircraft and flight departure from Bonn, 
not Luxembourg.  The DoS representative threatened to send the aid to another 
nation, called the Uzbek Minister for Humanitarian Aid into the meetings to help 
resolve the dispute, and informed the U.S. Ambassador, who planned to contact 
the Uzbek Minister of Foreign Affairs if the issue continued to be a problem.  
Panalpina was hamstrung – caught in the middle by the State Department’s 
request to use Uzbek Air and Uzbek Air’s control over all regional air traffic within 
Uzbekistan.  Panalpina committed, however, to pay for additional aircraft to 
ensure the shipment was made – though this never became necessary.  
Panalpina’s offer to absorb any additional cost was made, according to the local 
Panalpina representative, to keep its reputation sound with the Department of 
State, a frequent Panalpina customer.   
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d. A Successful Airlift 
Although delayed, the medical supplies were delivered as planned.  
Five pallets each were delivered to Urganch and Nukus, and fifteen pallets were 
delivered to the densely populated region of Andijon.  A Heart to Heart or 
PERDCA representative supervised each shipment, and the regional health 
directors who received the supplies inventoried them under the supervision of the 
customs agents before departing the airports.  PERDCA staff will conduct a 
follow-on inspection of aid distribution for Heart to Heart within one month. 
Figure III- 3  Pallets of Medical Aid are Unloaded from the Aircraft 
The Minister for Humanitarian Aid, Dr. Sharipov, is working to 
ensure aid is properly distributed to the Uzbek people.  He has instituted a 
labeling process for all donated medical aid.  Pharmacists must inventory aid 
upon receipt and mark it “Humanitarian Aid, Not for Resale.”  Logs must be kept 
of drugs issued by the hospital pharmacies, subject to inspection.  Additionally, 
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Sharipov’s staff visits bazaars and open air markets looking for black market 
medicines labeled as aid.  However, according to one Uzbek physician, there is 
little the Government can do to prevent doctors from selling access to the 
medications if not the medicines themselves [Ref 43].  Unless a payment is 
made, the doctor may not offer the medications in stock.   
The Minister for Humanitarian Aid hopes that the media can help 
reduce this practice by informing the public.  He believes if the media publicize 
the arrival of aid and its distribution to area clinics, the people will challenge the 
doctors and demand free medicines.  In Tashkent PERDCA contacted the press, 
which subsequently covered the U.S. Ambassador’s planeside reception.  The 
local radio and television news filmed the deliveries to Urganch and Nukus.  
Sharipov also plans to invite the media to his follow-on verification inspections of 
the clinics to reinforce to the public the availability of free medicines.  [Ref 44]   
Figure III-4  U. S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan John Herbst's Planeside Address 
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented information on contingency contracting operations 
in Uzbekistan, as well as the humanitarian operations of Heart to Heart and 
Samaritan's Purse.  The contingency contracting officers in Uzbekistan have 
processed hundreds of procurement actions for goods and services valued at 
more than $7 million.  They believe that better information early on could have 
improved their initial procurements.  They have not interacted with PVOs to 
obtain market information but do not oppose sharing market information with 
PVOs. 
Samaritan's Purse and Heart to Heart International have conducted airlifts 
of humanitarian aid to Uzbekistan as recently as December 2001.  Their 
organizations use on-the-job training to prepare staff members to conduct field 
procurement.  Both PVOs are currently drafting written guidelines for field 
operations.  A key component of their coordination and execution methods is 
networking with other PVOs already in country. 
Senior staff members of both Samaritan's Purse and Heart to Heart 
support cooperative networking efforts with the military, but other than an 
unsuccessful attempt by Mrs. Moore of Heart to Heart to contact an Embassy 
liaison to Karshi-Khanabad, no military-PVO networking occurred during 
Uzbekistan humanitarian operations.   
The next chapter reviews the potential for military-PVO procurement 
networking during stability operations.  It discusses the potential benefits of 
military-PVO procurement networking, means of networking, and possible 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
The real peacekeepers in a peace operation are the humanitarian 
relief organizations that provide both aid for the present and hope 
for the future.  They can be our allies, but they must at least be part 
of our planning and coordination efforts. 
Kenneth Allard 
Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned 
 
A. PURPOSE 
This chapter analyzes the information provided in previous chapters to 
glean the best practices used by Heart to Heart and Samaritan's Purse.  A best 
practice is defined as a process or method used by PVOs that produces positive 
results and is applicable to contingency contracting.  My analysis of Heart to 
Heart and Samaritan's Purse shows that there are three best practices applicable 
to contingency contracting: 
· In-depth training that fully prepares the project manager/coordinator 
to execute humanitarian operations; 
· Empowerment of the project manager/coordinator to procure 
resources and expend funds without seeking prior approval; 
· Networking with other PVOs before and during humanitarian 
operations to gather market information. 
Networking is by far the most useful practice identified: consequently, the bulk of 
this chapter discusses it. 
I analyze each best practice using a consistent format.  First, I review the 
process or method’s application within Heart to Heart and Samaritan's Purse.  I 
then discuss how this practice can be implemented within contingency 
contracting, assessing barriers to its implementation and means to overcome 
those barriers.  I complete the discussion of each best practice by identifying 
unintended consequences that might result from implementation and means to 
counter them (see Table IV-1, Chapter Outline).  The chapter concludes by 
summarizing the three best practices and their benefits.   
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This chapter recommends that in-depth training should be implemented 
into the contingency contracting officer development process, that contingency 
contracting officers initially deploying into and area to support stability operations 
should have additional freedom and discretion over expenditures; and that 
contingency contracting officers should strive to network with PVOs to gain 
market information. 
 
B. BEST PRACTICE:  IN-DEPTH TRAINING 
Both Heart to Heart and Samaritan's Purse train their project managers 
and country coordinators, respectively, using a long-term, hands-on, 
apprenticeship/mentoring method.  Training incorporates managing the project 
and the resources.  They believe no other means gives future project 
coordinators the means to quickly respond to the dynamic environment of 
humanitarian operations.  This training method produces coordinators that 
understand foreign cultures and know how to lead a humanitarian operation 
using procurement to support it.   
Chapter Outline 
A.  Purpose  
B.  Best Practice:  In-Depth Training  
1.  Training within PVOs 
2.  Military Implementation 
a.  Hands -On Training 
b.  Mentoring/Apprenticeship 
3.  Barriers to Implementation 
4.  Pitfalls of Implementation 
C.  Best Practice:  Purchasing Authority  
1.  Delegated Purchase Authority 
2.  Military Implementation 
3.  Barriers to Implementation 
4.  Pitfalls of Implementation 
D.  Best Practice:  Networking 
1.  Networking to Obtain Information 
2.  Implementation 
a.  PVOs Provide the Pattern: 
Networking 
b.  The CMOC Can Help Contingency 
Contracting Officers Develop PVO 
Contacts  
c.  Market Data Supplied by PVOs Can 
Produce Lower Prices and Reduce 
Performance Risk 
d.  Information Sharing Can Reduce 
Resource Competition 
3.  Barriers to Implementation 
a.  Proprietary Data Restrictions 
b.  Military Cultural Bias Against PVOs 
4.  Pitfalls of Implementation 
a.  Proprietary Data Violations 
b.  Undue PVO Influence 
E.  Chapter Summary 
Table IV-1 
 65
1. Training within PVOs 
Training takes places over several months and multiple humanitarian 
operations.  The training is hands-on; future coordinators assist with current 
projects learning the means of coordinating, executing, and financing a mission 
under the care of experienced staff members.  New coordinators are specifically 
trained to seek out PVOs operating in-country for assistance.  They are exposed 
to negotiations and discussions with U.S. and host nation officials, eventually 
becoming the chief negotiator with their mentor assisting.  Responsibilities are 
gradually added to the trainee’s duties, including the authority to procure 
resources.  Training takes place both in the office during the coordination phase 
and abroad during mission execution.  When a trainee has demonstrated sound 
judgment and has learned to negotiate, coordinate, and fund an operation, he or 
she is first given small projects or advance party coordination duties.  As 
experience grows he or she is given larger responsibilities.  Only the most 
reliable coordinators, with demonstrated performance, are assigned to critical 
projects.  The product of hands-on training methods is a coordinator fully capable 
of executing a humanitarian operation with little supervision. 
Although written guidelines are being developed by both PVOs studied, in 
neither case are those guidelines prescriptive.  Coordinators are delegated the 
authority to make decisions on the ground including purchase authority.  Their 
hands-on training methods mesh well with the flexibility of their policies and 
delegation of authority.  Coordinators are also taught to determine the need, 
select the resources to meet that need, purchase those resources, and maximize 
their use.  Coordinators are taught to manage and account for the funds 
expended.  This training produces a coordinator that can confidently enter a new 
area, locate other organizations that can support the mission, and resource and 
execute the humanitarian mission with minimal input from the PVO’s 
headquarters. 
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2. Military Implementation 
a. Hands-On Training 
Hands-on training of contingency contracting officers could be 
incorporated into the training through temporary duty assignments (TDY) to 
ongoing stability operations.  These deployments could last up to six weeks and 
would provide new contingency contracting officers direct experience assisting 
seasoned contracting officers in the field.  They could sit in on negotiations, 
observe cultural differences, and gain experience with the documentation 
process.  The optimum time of TDY would be immediately following Defense 
Acquisition University course CON 234.   
A less effective alternative would be the inclusion of scenario-based 
training in CON 234.  Contingency contracting officers spend months learning 
acquisition policies and regulations, yet only two weeks studying contingency 
contracting.  Captain Robare echoed the AFARS Contingency Contracting 
Manual’s observation that local culture and business practices impact 
contracting.  He also noted the inexperience of most contingency contracting 
officers during their initial deployments.  One contingency contracting officer 
Robare quoted said,  
Very few KOs get training in services, writing a large dollar contract, 
how to negotiate, or making price reasonableness determinations 
when there are no published prices….  [Ref. 10] 
 
Robare writes that this lack of knowledge makes it difficult for contingency 
contracting officers to quickly identify and select sources, negotiate reasonable 
prices, and write contracts that minimize risk to both parties.  In his thesis 
comparing contingency contracting training across the Department of Defense, 
McMillon concluded that current training does not fully prepare a contingency 
contracting officer [Ref. 11].  Robare and McMillon both support scenario-based 
contingency contracting training simulations.  Use of affordable digital video 
technology could create interactive CD ROMs presenting a series of situations 
for trainees to review, followed by questions to answer.  Implementation of 
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simulations, though not as effective as hands-on training, could enhance the 
training of contingency contracting officers and make their initial deployments 
more successful.   
b. Mentoring/Apprenticeship  
In most contracting organizations, there should be some officers 
with prior contingency contracting experience.  Teaming new contingency 
contracting officers with those with experience in a mentoring relationship before 
and during stability operation contracting support may facilitate faster learning of 
contingency contracting knowledge, skills, and abilities not found in the texts, 
including cultural considerations.   
Another possibility is military internships with PVOs.  Major military 
commands should consider their area of responsibility (AOR), threats in the area, 
and coordinate with PVOs/NGOs operating in the area when arranging an 
internship.  Locating a favorable humanitarian organization already operating in 
the AOR will reap intelligence, cultural, socio-economic, and market research 
benefits.  Embedding a contingency contracting officer into a PVO’s humanitarian 
operations for a short period would also promote positive interaction, facilitating 
better understanding between military and PVO cultures.  USAID supports 
military internships with PVOs as well as their own agency.  When given the 
opportunity to provide input to this thesis on the benefits of military internships, 
Roger P. Winter, USAID Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, 
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, said 
USAID supports the exchange of military officers to improve 
cooperation and efficiency in the field as well as the deployment of 
USAID personnel to component commands to facilitate 
coordination.  Military liaison officers in the Office of Federal 
Disaster Assistance directly support the component commands and 
have been deployed to SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM in the past as 
needed. 
Experience has shown that the value added through these 
exchanges is increased communication and improved coordination 
of efforts through a greater understanding of our shared mission to 
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provide aid and assistance within the framework of U.S. foreign 
policy.  [Ref. 54] 
 
3. Barriers to Implementation 
There are no barriers to developing CD ROM-based scenarios other than 
the minimal cost of production.  An enterprising person with a digital video 
camera, personal computer, and web page design skills could develop simple 
scenarios at low cost.   
Hands-on training via TDY presents much larger barriers.  A significant 
investment in TDY expenses would be incurred.  Manning critical contracting 
positions is another problem; loss of contingency contracting officers for up to six 
weeks may exacerbate manning difficulties.  These barriers cannot be 
eliminated, but the costs are manageable.  If implemented, contracting 
commands must carefully select a few contingency contracting officers for this 
additional training.  By limiting TDYs to a small number of contingency 
contracting officers per Major Command, Marine Expeditionary Unit, Fleet, or Air 
Combat Command, military units can increase the experience level of their 
contracting officers most likely to deploy without sacrificing overall manning.  If 
experienced contingency contracting officers are on staff, additional training of a 
new contingency contracting officer via TDY to a stability operation is probably 
unnecessary.  If no contingency contracting officers on staff have field 
experience, however, the resources expended to send one officer TDY may be a 
valuable investment.  
PVO internships by contingency contracting officers seems a frivolous use 
of contingency contracting skills while the military is deep in the throes of 
Operation Enduring Freedom.  When a new phase of calm returns, however, and 
units potentially spend years without a major deployment, such a teaming 
arrangement becomes much more feasible.  Likewise, the lessons learned while 
interned would provide experiences unattainable in peacetime.  As with 
contingency contracting TDYs discussed above, the personnel and financial 
resources required for an internship are great.  Only a few contingency 
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contracting officers should be selected for internships with PVOs; the follow-on 
assignment should leverage this training by placing the contingency contracting 
officers in positions where they can use and share their experiences.  
Significantly, the need for and benefits of this training grow as the military 
performs fewer stability operations.  When there are fewer deployments, 
contingency contracting officers are not as critical to their units.  Training funds 
are more available.  Therefore, as the need for the training increases, resource 
availability also increases. 
4. Pitfalls of Implementation  
Not to be confused with barriers, pitfalls are negative unintended 
consequences that result from implementing recommended changes.  There are 
no pitfalls to additional training.  The experiences gained through hands-on 
training, scenarios, mentoring and internship can only enhance the performance 
of contingency contracting officers.  However, there are inherent security risks 
whenever one is deployed.  Precautions must be taken to ensure officers abroad 
with PVOs during an internship are not placed in areas clearly hostile to the U.S.  
Such precautions should include wearing of civilian clothes only, relaxing of 
military appearance standards, use of the civilian passport rather than the 
Geneva Conventions Armed Forces Identification Card as the primary form of 
identification, and restriction of travel only to countries with manageable safety 
and security risks.  
 
C. BEST PRACTICE:  PURCHASING AUTHORITY 
Both Heart to Heart and Samaritan's Purse delegate purchasing authority 
to the senior representative deployed on the humanitarian operation.  The 
country coordinator (Samaritan's Purse) or project manager (Heart to Heart) is 
empowered to assess the needs, procure the resources necessary to meet the 
needs, and take the necessary steps to complete the humanitarian operation 
without seeking approvals from higher levels of the organization.   
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1. Delegated Purchase Authority 
Within the studied PVOs there is no requirement to seek approval for 
routine purchases from higher levels of the PVO organization.  Heart to Heart 
and Samaritan's Purse have an unwavering focus on successfully completing 
humanitarian operations and their policies and procedures reflect this focus .  
Their written procurement policies serve as flexible guidelines to assist 
coordinators in decision-making.  Their policies delegate maximum authority to 
the coordinators on the ground, including  -- in Samaritan's Purse’s case – 
purchase authority for commitments well above the Government’s $200,000 
simplified acquisition threshold.  Even with this exceptional spending authority 
without prior approval, Samaritan's Purse carefully accounts for each dollar and 
makes every effort to spend funds wisely – accountable to God and the donors, 
as Samaritan's Purse accountant Jackie Blevins stated [Ref. 34].  Also, only 
those individuals that have demonstrated sound judgment, financial 
responsibility, and have extensive experience are selected as coordinators for 
major projects.  Additionally, on major projects, Samaritan's Purse includes a 
bookkeeper who helps the coordinator maintain accountability and who reports to 
headquarters weekly. 
The PVOs have flexible procedures and delegate authority to the lowest 
level, enabling coordinators to rapidly respond to a crisis and quickly adjust to 
situational changes, such as Samaritan's Purse’s rapid response to the Nahrin 
earthquake in Afghanistan.  When minutes count, hours are not spent seeking 
approval.  Before official approval to send supplies and medical personnel was 
granted from Samaritan's Purse headquarters in Boone, North Carolina, trucks 
were already on the road from Kholm to Nahrin with physicians, medical 
supplies, and shelter materials.  [Ref. 35] 
2. Military Implementation 
As noted in Chapter II, many requirements of the FAR are waived or 
relaxed during contingency operations.  The easing of regulations during 
contingency contracting operations gives the contracting officer much of the 
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needed flexibility to support the military force.  The Defense Acquisition 
University course on contingency contracting teaches that the contingency 
contracting officer must ask for delegation of authority, however [Ref. 45].  To 
fully achieve the flexibility necessary to execute contingency contracting, 
contracting officers must not ask for delegation of authority but plan for it.  The 
contingency contracting support plan for operations should include deliberate 
delegation of all possible authority to the deploying contingency contracting 
officers.  Included in the plan should be memoranda, ready to be signed, granting 
contingency contracting officers additional authority.  
The military should also consider granting the contingency contracting 
officer full authority to obligate available funds without consultation and approval 
from higher levels of contracting authority.  The contingency contracting officer 
should control the purse during the first weeks of a stability operation.  Like the 
coordinators of the PVOs, contingency contracting officers should be empowered 
to assess the needs, procure the resources necessary to meet the needs, and 
take the necessary steps to support the force without seeking approvals from 
higher levels of the command.   
This empowerment in no way implies any less accountability of funds or 
responsibility for efficient use of Government funds.  Like the PVOs, contingency 
contracting officers are committed to high standards of conduct and understand 
the scrutiny of their expenditures.  A disbursing officer can still verify every 
expenditure.  Adopting this policy gives the contingency contracting officer the 
ability to rapidly respond to the needs of the military force without sacrificing 
accountability.   
3. Barriers to Implementation 
The Federal Acquisition Regulations pose a barrier to empowerment by 
limiting the delegation of additional monetary authority to contingency contracting 
officers.  These restrictions exist in part because the full power of Executive 
Order 10789 and 29 USC 1431 is rarely applied.  Title 29 U.S. Code Section 
1431 gives the President the authority – which by Presidential Executive Order 
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10789 has been delegated to the Secretaries of the Armed Forces – to set aside 
all acquisition regulations for procurements under $50,000.00.  In part, Section 
1431 reads 
The President may authorize any department or agency of the 
Government which exercises functions in connection with the 
national defense, acting in accordance with regulations prescribed 
by the President for the protection of the Government, to enter into 
contracts or into amendments or modifications of contracts 
heretofore or hereafter made and to make advance payments 
thereon, without regard to other provisions of law relating to the 
making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts, 
whenever he deems that such action would facilitate the national 
defense.  [Ref. 46] 
 
Section 1431 clearly establishes the necessary authority contingency contracting 
officers need to exercise greater control over funds.  However, a risk-averse 
administrative culture can sometimes become a barrier to delegation of such 
broad contracting authority.  To obtain the flexibility and responsiveness that 
additional financial empowerment of contingency contracting officers can provide, 
FAR requirements must be waived.  Leaders with delegation authority at all 
levels must shift from risk aversion to risk management, understanding that the 
benefits of empowerment outweigh the limited risk of granting contingency 
contracting officers full control over purchases under $50,000.   
This additional “extraordinary” contracting authority need not be granted 
for the duration of the operation.  Rather, it should be carefully measured out to a 
select few contingency contracting officers who are establishing operations in 
new locations where flexibility and responsiveness are critical.  Major Commands 
should identify personnel for an Early Entry Contracting Team (EECT) and train 
its members via CON 234, additional hands-on training as discussed above, and 
empower a member of the team with greater control over funds.  Also, the 
contingency contracting officers selected as first responders should not be 
selected unless they have previously demonstrated their reliability and sound 
judgment – much like the project managers of PVOs.  Once the initial confusion 
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and chaos have been resolved, the additional authority can be revoked, or the 
team can be replaced by contingency contracting officers with standard authority 
and training. 
Additionally, during the contingency planning process, the contacting staff 
must include the invocation and duration of needed waivers into the contingency 
contracting support plan.  The hours prior to a short-notice contingency 
contracting operation are not the time to explain the need to empower 
contingency contracting officers. 
4. Pitfalls of Implementation  
The potential pitfalls of granting purse authority to the contingency 
contracting officer are readily apparent:  arbitrary and capricious, unethical, or 
criminal actions, and Anti-deficiency Act violations (“an officer or employee of the 
United States Government … may not make or authorize an expenditure or 
obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation or fund…” [Ref 
47]).  Another possible pitfall is inadvertent mismanagement or misallocation of 
funds; without existing regulatory controls the contingency contracting officer may 
unintentionally overspend.  The contingency contracting officer may also be more 
susceptible to pressures from the task force commander.  If contingency 
contracting officers have control of the purse, they may spend funds 
indiscriminately and fail to properly support the force.   
These possibilities, though, are remote.  Even if additional spending 
authority is granted, contingency contracting officers maintain all the 
accountability requirements.  The disbursing officer remains to verify 
expenditures.  The character traits demonstrated by the contracting officer when 
granted his or her warrant do not dissolve with the regulatory requirements.  
Finally, this extraordinary authority need not remain in place after the deployment 
phase is complete.  
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D. BEST PRACTICE:  NETWORKING 
1. Networking to Obtain Information 
Having reviewed the operations of Heart to Heart and Samaritan's Purse, 
the key element that differentiates their procurement methods from contingency 
contracting is networking.  Prior to departure on a humanitarian operation, as an 
integral part of mission planning, the studied PVOs network with the U.S. 
Embassy staff, individuals, and PVOs already in country.  Their networking goals 
during the planning stage are: 
· Determine the need; 
· Estimate the appropriate response; 
· Become familiar with the culture, economic and political situation; 
· Determine which international organizations are in the region.  
 
A key task of networking is to determine the people in the region that exercise 
the influence necessary to support the relief mission.  Local coordinators for 
Heart to Heart also assist by assessing the needs in country and reporting them 
to Heart to Heart.  This enables Heart to Heart to better prepare airlifts of aid for 
shipment.  Prior to departure, the PVOs coordinate meetings with these key 
players including foreign Government officials, U.S. Government officials at the 
Embassy and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), locally 
operating PVOs, local coordinators, and individuals willing to assist. 
By the time Heart to Heart or Samaritan's Purse enter the country, key 
local support is already coordinated.  Once on the ground, this local support 
network assists the PVOs in resourcing and executing their humanitarian 
mission.  The local support network provides critical liaison into the host nation 
Government, sources of supplies and services, transportation, and warehousing.  
Without the support of the pre-existing local PVO network, the PVO must send 
out an advance party weeks in advance to coordinate an airlift, arrange life 
support, and coordinate aid receipt and distribution.   
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2. Implementation  
a. PVOs Provide The Pattern: Networking 
CPT Robare concluded his thesis by asking,  
Given the differences in culture, language, customs and business 
practices encountered by contingency contracting officers … what 
are the problems surrounding the contract award … and how can 
these issues be effectively dealt with to prevent or resolve the 
problems?  [Ref. 10]   
 
A key problem surrounding contract award identified by the contingency 
contracting officers I interviewed was the lack of market information early on in 
the deployment.  PVOs provide a reliable source of sound market information.  
Networking with PVOs also provides valuable insights into the contingency 
environment – culture, customs, and business practices – to aid the contingency 
contracting officer in executing his duties. 
Just as Samaritan's Purse and Heart to Heart network with other 
PVOs to share information, so should contingency contracting officers network 
with PVOs.  Before Samaritan's Purse or Heart to Heart personnel ever depart 
the United States, they begin to network with PVOs in country.  They contact 
other organizations they know or suspect are already operating in the region and 
attempt to establish communication with supportive fellow PVOs in country.  U.S. 
Government agencies like USAID and the Embassy or Consulate are contacted 
to locate PVOs.  Contingency contracting officers should also attempt to 
establish PVO contacts prior to deployment, collecting market information to 
incorporate into the procurement planning.  Contingency contracting officers can 
find contact information on major NGOs and PVOs operating in an area via the 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs web site, ReliefWeb© 
(http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf) and also at InterAction©, the American 
Council for Voluntary International Action (ACVIA) website 
(http://www.interaction.org).  ACVIA has established standards for members 
PVOs in the areas of governance, finance, communications with the U.S. public, 
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management practice, human resources, programs, and public policy.  It is also 
conceivable tha t as contingency contracting officers network among themselves 
an internal list or database of supportive PVOs could be developed to contact 
first before cold-calling PVOs known to be operating in a country. 
Captain Seiple commented in his thesis on the civil-military 
relationship that “[C]oordination requires an exchange.  NGOs will not come to a 
meeting unless there is something to be gained” [Ref. 48].  There must be an 
exchange of information – the PVOs should also benefit from sharing market 
information.  As contingency contracting officers determine sources of supply, 
wage, and pricing information, this information can be shared with PVOs.  If the 
military and PVOs share information, beneficial competition in the buyers’ favor 
may result.  Bidding wars between the military and PVOs can be avoided.   
b. The CMOC Can Help Contingency Contracting Officers 
Develop PVO Contacts 
Many NGOs and PVOs already operate closely with the CMOC.  
Andrew Natsios, the current Administrator of USAID has written:  
the most practical mechanism for ensuring that some coherent 
design and planning does take place is the system of civil-military 
operations centers, developed to establish and maintain operational 
contact among the military and humanitarian participants in a 
complex operation.  The CMOC’s usefulness is clear to most of the 
humanitarian agencies.”  [Ref. 49] 
 
The CMOC can serve as a conduit for communication between 
contingency contracting officers and PVO procurers.  As PVOs pass through the 
CMOC, contingency contracting officers can learn which PVOs are favorable to 
military cooperation and establish contacts with them.  After contacts are made, 
market research information can be exchanged via cellular phone, email, or face-
to-face communication.  When a contractor for a temporary construction project 
is needed – temporary latrines or guard towers, for example – the contingency 
contracting officer could approach the CMOC staff to determine if any PVOs 
operating in the area have built temporary facilities for displaced persons.  A 
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phone call to a cooperative PVO can quickly yield what local firm was hired, type 
of construction, and price.   
If the CMOC does not yet have contact information on area PVOs, 
they will at least have contact with the humanitarian operations center (HOC) – 
the coordination cell for NGOs/PVOs in country.  The HOC maintains contact 
information on almost all humanitarian organizations operating in country, as well 
as the location, mission, or objective for each PVO.  Additional sources of contact 
information for PVOs include UN agencies like the World Health Organization or 
High Commission for Refugees, USAID, and the U.S. Embassy or Consulate.   
Contingency contracting officers often operate in a Joint 
Contracting Cell (JCC) through which all procurements are coordinated.  My 
recommendation is to co-locate the JCC with the CMOC in the base camp.  Local 
national contractors visit the JCC just as PVOs and host nation officials visit the 
CMOC; both the JCC and CMOC need ready access to a secured base camp 
entrance.  If these cells were adjacent to each other, it would facilitate exchange 
of information and better coordination.  The contingency contracting officers and 
civil affairs staff are often the only elements of the military force regularly leaving 
the base camp and meeting with local nationals.  By working together, the JCC 
and CMOC could assist each other with security and transportation, as well as 
exchange market information and intelligence. 
My observations in Uzbekistan indicate it should not require in-
depth research to establish contacts with PVOs willing to share information.  If a 
PVO staffer cannot help, he or she will provide the name of someone who can.  
In Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Erick Shenkel of the Central Asian-American 
Partnership for Academic Development serves voluntarily as the liaison between 
numerous PVOs, USAID, and the Uzbek Government.  I was directed to him by 
Heart to Heart, PERDCA, and Northwest Medical staff to support my research.   
Shenkel was very supportive of PVO interaction with the military.  In 
fact, of more than one dozen representatives from six different PVOs, no one 
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with whom I spoke opposed cooperation and sharing of market information with 
contingency contracting officers. 
c. Market Data Supplied By PVOs Can Produce Lower  
Prices and Reduce Performance Risk 
Market information is critical to the first weeks of a deployment to 
an immature contracting environment.  The contingency contracting officer is 
often unaware of what sources of supply exist in the area o r which suppliers 
provide the best value.  The host nation sometimes provides a list of preferred 
suppliers, but as the contingency contracting officers in Uzbekistan found, these 
suppliers are not necessarily the best sources.  As already noted, contingency 
contracting officers do not have access to local market information, culture, or 
business practices.  An exchange of market information with PVOs can offset this 
deficiency. 
Recall the contingency contracting officer who exchanged market 
information with media purchasing agents.  Journalists were paying $125 per day 
for linguists and were surprised to discover the military was paid only $600 per 
month.  The media purchasing agents, with this simple exchange of information, 
potentially saved thousands of dollars. 
Consider the switching of cellular phone service by the task force 
contingency contracting officers in Uzbekistan.  After signing an agreement for 
cellular service with Unitel, they soon changed service to Uzdron-Rubita to obtain 
wider signal coverage needed to conduct their mission.  Time and funds were 
sacrificed to learn which firm had the best coverage, not to mention the 
inefficiencies introduced due to missed calls.  In contrast, when Barbi Moore 
arrived in country, her PVO contacts provided her with a cell phone with the best 
available signal coverage throughout Uzbekistan.  The in-country PVOs had the 
market information that made this possible.  This same logic can be applied to 
any product or service.   
Contract schedule and performance risk can also be lowered when 
the right contractors are chosen for the right jobs.  One contingency contracting 
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officer stated that the initial firms selected from the host nation-provided list had 
difficulty performing the work, but as he learned which firms could best perform 
which types of work, overall contractor performance improved.  FAR Part 15.305 
(a)(2)(ii), Source Selection, permits the contracting officer to consider past 
performance information provided by the offeror and “any other sources.”  PVOs 
may have had bad experiences in the past with contractors now bidding for 
Government services, and can alert contingency contracting officers to potential 
performance problems that require independent research by the contingency 
contracting officer.  Likewise, PVOs can note excellent performance.   
PVOs can provide useful information on businesses operating in 
the region.  However, PVOs can have agendas, and market information provided 
should be considered in concert with other sources, including other PVOs, the 
host nation, USAID, and Embassy staff. 
d. Information Sharing Can Reduce Resource Competition   
CPT Robare identifies resource competition as a problem during 
stability operations.  He noted that in contingency contracting officers face a 
severely limited supplier base during stability operations and frequently enter into 
competition with each other, contractors on the battlefield, and multi-national 
forces.  [Ref. 10]  An element of competition Robare did not discuss was 
competition for supplies and services with humanitarian organizations.   
In complex contingency operations, PVOs can sometimes 
outnumber the military forces on the ground.  Recall the inflation of prices during 
contingency operations reported by the Center for Naval Analyses.  It discovered 
that when the military enters an area, prices increase as the military and PVOs 
bid against each other.  [Ref. 12]  
Robare recommends a centralized contracting structure to provide 
a means of coordination among contracting activities.  This step will not eliminate 
competition with PVOs.  Contingency contracting officers could, however, invite 
PVO procurement personnel into the coordination loop to further reduce 
competition.  Competitive forces will rule the market, but if contingency 
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contracting officers and PVO procurement personnel share information on 
markets and suppliers both the military and PVOs will benefit. 
3. Barriers to Implementation 
a. Proprietary Data Restrictions 
There are regulatory limitations to protect business’ proprietary and 
past performance data, and release of information to PVOs to assist their 
procurement may seem to violate these restrictions.  However, contract award 
information released along the guidelines provided by FAR Part 5.207, 
Preparation and Transmittal of Synopses, including winning contractor, dollar 
amount, and quantity can provide valuable information to PVO procurers.  FAR 
Part 5.202 exempts contingency contracting officers from synopses 
requirements, but nothing prohibits the release of this information.  Also 
releasable are prevailing wage rates, sources of supply, or names and addresses 
of contractors that are debarred, suspended, or proposed for such (FAR Part 
9.4).  [Ref. 50] 
b. Mutual Cultural Bias Between the Military and PVOs 
If the contingency contracting officer remains mindful of proprietary 
data restrictions when networking with PVOs, the only remaining barrier to 
networking is cultural biases between PVOs and the military.  Members of both 
organizations may view each other through stereotypic lenses that prevent 
cooperation.  PVOs fear that by cooperating with the military they may lose their 
reputation for neutrality.  Military members may see PVOs as nuisances that 
complicate if not frustrate stability operations.  Cultural biases can be overcome 
by increased exposure, civil-military conferences during peacetime, and through 
internships as described in section B of this chapter.  The impetus to take these 
steps already exists.  Presidential Decision Directive 56 mandates interagency 
cooperation and encourages including NGOs and PVOs in the planning and 
coordination of complex contingency operations. 
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A problem concerning networking with PVOs and using the CMOC 
as a means to network is the opinion that it is little more than an information 
collection point for the military force – a means to gather information on 
NGO/PVO activities and encourage/discourage their actions based on military 
objectives.  Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, 
short-sightedly views properly executed civil-military operations as a means to  
… reduce friction between the civilian population and the military 
force.  The objective is to minimize interference with military 
operations by the civilian population.  When possible, a second 
objective is to reduce military interference with the civilian 
populace.  [Ref. 15] 
 
This view underutilizes the CMOC’s capability and serves as a disincentive for 
humanitarian organizations.  Properly executed civil-military operations includes 
cooperation, coordination, and when possible mutual understanding and support 
of common objectives.  As Captain Seiple commented, PVOs will not come to a 
CMOC meeting unless there is something to be gained.  [Ref. 48]  The CMOC 
can be used as a gathering point for NGOs and PVOs to coordinate assistance, 
plan aid transport routes in concert with military supply routes, convoy schedules 
and mobility, and receive up to date information on threats, mines, de-mining 
operations, and weather.    
Contingency contracting officers may also fall victim to the false 
beliefs about PVOs based on past bad experiences.  One contingency 
contracting officer interviewed referred to many PVOs as ‘tree-hugger types that 
meant well but had the business sense of rocks” [Ref. 51].  The contingency 
contracting officer should remember that there is greater probability that 
international PVOs and NGOs are biased against the military than North 
American-based PVOs [Ref. 37], and that all PVOs are not equally skilled in 
negotiating.  When making contacts, contingency contracting officers would 
serve their interests best by seeking out Core-Team PVOs as identified by 
RAND.  As indicated earlier, Core-Team PVOs are those that are highly 
competent, broadly capable, and predisposed to cooperate with the military. 
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4. Pitfalls of Implementation  
Networking with PVOs will provide contingency contracting officers with 
previously unavailable market information early in the deployment.  However, 
networking with non-military organizations will certainly have some negative side 
effects.  If contingency contracting officers are already aware of the pitfalls before 
they develop a cooperative relationship with PVO procurement personnel, 
unintended consequences can be avoided.   
As previously mentioned, PVOs will expect an exchange of information, 
not one-sided depositing of valuable market research into the contingency 
contracting officer’s account.  There are four potential problems with exchanging 
information with PVOs:  1) receiving poor information, 2) violating proprietary 
data rights, 3) quid pro quo expectations, and 4) divulging classified operational 
information.  Each of these could be damaging to contingency contracting 
operations if not the stability operation. 
a. Poor Quality Information 
Information sharing is only as valuable as the information shared 
[Ref. 52].  If PVOs provide information that is not timely or accurate, it has no 
value added to the contingency contracting officer.  The contingency contracting 
officer must validate market information provided by PVOs via a second source, 
be it the contingency contracting officer’s own research, a site visit, host nation 
sources, confirmation by another PVO, or input from another agency’s 
contracting staff.  
b. Proprietary Data Violations 
As a contingency contracting officer gains familiarity with his PVO 
contacts, he or she may begin to inadvertently disclose contractor information 
that is too detailed, perhaps revealing proprietary data.  This risk is potentially 
greater than the risk of revealing proprietary data of one contractor to another 
because the PVO may seem to be “outside” the procurement process, and the 
contingency contracting officer may unintentionally let his guard down during 
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conversations with PVO procurement professionals.  The contingency 
contracting officer must remain mindful of the restrictions on disclosure when 
dealing with PVOs.   
c. Undue PVO Influence  
A second, more likely problem is the potential for PVOs to expect to 
influence the procurement process in exchange for providing market information.  
The interests and objectives of the military and PVOs will often be mutual, but at 
some point those interests will compete if not contradict.  Many PVOs have a 
particular cause or ideology they support and gravitate to suppliers with the same 
orientation – perhaps firms of the same religion, ideology, or ethnicity.  PVOs 
may also provide biased information to steer the contingency contracting officer 
toward particular suppliers and contractors that support the PVO’s cause.  PVOs 
may prevent the contingency contracting officer from learning about their 
preferred supplier of a commodity in high demand – bottled water, for example – 
to protect their source of supply from competition.   
As contingency contracting officers work more closely with PVOs, it 
is inevitable that at some point an organization may attempt to place undue 
influence on the contracting process.  Consider Samaritan's Purse and Heart to 
Heart’s problems with Uzbek Air.  The Government of Uzbekistan pressured 
Samaritan’s Purse until the last possible minute to use Uzbek Air as its air 
carrier.  By attempting to improve relations with Uzbekistan, the State 
Department influenced its contracted freight forwarding firm, Panalpina, to use 
Uzbek Air with near disastrous results.  Uzbek Air, already receiving 71% of the 
$107,000.00 contract, demanded $20,000.00 more, and when this failed tried to 
cut costs by using one aircraft instead of two as agreed in the subcontract.  This 
maneuvering by Uzbek Air forced the State Department to violate privity 
guidelines to resolve the conflict by entering into direct negotiations with Uzbek 
Air.  Although not PVOs, the Uzbek Government and Uzbek Air illustrate how 
extra-contractual relationships can result in attempts to achieve undue influence. 
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The contingency contracting officer, merely by being forewarned of 
the potential for undue influence and inadvertent disclosures of proprietary data, 
is far less likely to experience problems.  A concrete step to avoid disclosing 
proprietary data is to locally synopsize contract awards via the bid board.  
Contract award information can be locally posted on the bid board in accordance 
with FAR Part 5.207 [Ref. 50].  PVOs as well as bidders will have access to the 
bid board; therefore, the contingency contracting officer can refer them to the 
board to ensure each has equal access to the same releasable information.   
A means of guarding against undue influence is to maintain an 
“arm’s length” relationship – working closely with other organizations but keeping 
enough distance to remain objective and professional – with PVOs as well as 
sources of supply and contractors.  An obvious and essential part of the buyer-
seller relationship, applying this concept to information exchanges with PVOs will 
reduce the potential for problems.  PVOs understand the need to safeguard 
impartiality; successful PVOs often operate on both sides of a crisis when any 
perceived partiality could jeopardize their mission and their lives.  North 
American-based PVOs willing to exchange market information should also 
understand and quickly accept the need to remain at an arm’s length.   
d. Revealing Classified Operational Information 
When contingency contracting officers interact with any person or 
group outside the military, they risk telegraphing operational intent.  Seeking 
market information from PVOs can reveal operational information.  For example, 
asking PVOs for information on construction materials and contractors can signal 
mission expansion and additional incoming troops.  The contingency contracting 
officer must consider the information that may be inferred during networking and 
balance the risk of divulging operational information with the benefits gained by 
networking.   
Contingency contracting officers must be extraordinarily careful 
when soliciting information from outside sources including PVOs prior to a 
deployment.  Unless the mission has clearly been released in advance to the 
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public – such as U.S. forces’ participation in the Implementation Force of the 
1995 Dayton Peace Accord, Bosnia-Hercegovina – the contingency contracting 
officer should refrain from contacting PVOs to collect information.  This does not 
preclude internet searches and creation of contact lists for use as soon as the 
operation is public. 
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
There are three best practices that can be reasonably incorporated into 
military contingency contracting with positive results:  in-depth training, financial 
empowerment, and networking.  In-depth, hands-on training that includes time 
spent deployed on a contingency contracting operation or with a PVO as an 
intern will train contingency contracting officers in culture and practices far 
beyond CON 234.  Training simulations are another more affordable, yet less 
effective alterative.  Financial empowerment of a member of the initial contracting 
team beginning support for a stability operations will increase the responsiveness 
of contingency contracting without sacrificing accountability.   
Finally, if contingency contracting officers use the CMOC to network with 
PVOs already operating in the region, they can gain otherwise unavailable 
information on the markets, culture, business practices, supplier base, and local 
Government.  This information will help contingency contracting officers better 
support the deployed force early on, when contingency contracting is most 
critical.  The end result of networking will be better performance, reduced risk, 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Complex emergencies inextricably link humanitarian and military 
entities in a bond of mutual dependence and reliance, which in turn 
requires information sharing across organizational lines. 
 
2001 Civil Affairs Conference Report 
United States Institute for Peace 
 
A. PURPOSE 
This chapter summarizes the research presented in chapters I through IV.  
It restates and answers the primary and secondary research questions.  It then 
offers conclusions and recommendations for application of PVO best practices to 
contingency contracting.  This chapter concludes with recommendations for 
further research (see Table V-1).   
 
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION - ASKED AND ANSWERED 
This thesis’ primary goal was to determine which best practices can be 
gleaned by comparing and contrasting the procurement methods of private 
volunteer organizations and contingency contracting operations when responding 
to remote regions in crisis. 
My analysis of Heart to Heart and Samaritan's Purse identifies three best 
practices applicable to contingency contracting: 
· In-depth training that fully prepares the project manager/coordinator 
to execute humanitarian operations; 
· Empowerment of the project manager/coordinator to procure 
resources and expend funds without seeking prior approval; 
Chapter Outline 
A.  Purpose  
B.  Primary Research Question - Asked and 
Answered  
C.  Secondary Research Questions - Asked 
and Answered 
D.  Conclusions 
E.  Recommendations 




· Networking with other PVOs before and during humanitarian 
operations to gather market information. 
 
C. SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS - ASKED AND ANSWERED 
1. What parallels exist between the missions PVOs perform and 
stability operations that lend credence to a comparison of their 
procurement systems? 
Like the military, PVOs must often deliver personnel, equipment, and 
supplies to remote locations on short notice.  PVOs are varied in structure and 
mission, but operate in the same austere, hazardous environments, and often at 
the same time as U.S. military forces.  PVOs often choose the same supply 
routes, coordinate with the same host nation officials, and seek to assist the 
same population as the military.  Furthermore, the obstacles PVO procurement 
personnel must overcome to successfully execute their mission are very similar 
to the military’s contingency contracting officers, including resource shortfalls, 
threat of injury, and a need to respond rapidly to a dynamic environment.  The 
procurement needs of PVOs – water, shelter, construction materials, etc. – are 
common military needs as well. 
2. How are PVO procurement and contingency contracting 
similar/different in: 
· Degree of preparation prior to negotiation and execution of 
contracts? 
· Policies, regulations, and standing operating procedures? 
· Organizational structure, reporting, warranting, and authority?  
 
Contingency contracting officers conduct market research and planning 
procurement actions in a more structured manner than private volunteer 
organizations.  PVOs have less formal procedures and therefore much more 
flexibility.  Pre-negotiation preparation consists of identifying the needs and 
conducting informal market research through networking with other PVOs before 
purchase.  Heart to Heart and Samaritan's Purse have guidebooks in 
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development to aid their personnel, but have no strict procurement procedures 
like the FAR.  PVO guidelines are carefully crafted to not limit the flexibility and 
authority of the senior person in country.   
PVO organizational structure is more flat than the military, with the 
authority to make purchases resting fully with the coordinator or project manager 
on the ground.  With few exceptions, approval for purchases need not be sought.  
Accounting for expenditures, however, is aggressive.  PVOs do not warrant their 
country coordinators/managers.  Persons are assigned to positions of fiscal 
authority only after extensive training and are proven to be trustworthy. 
3. How are PVO procurement and contingency contracting 
similar/different in: 
· Types of contracts used? 
· Prices paid on similar contracts in the same region? 
· Methods for establishment of in-country operations? 
· Methods of contracting while sustaining operations? 
 
PVOs predominantly used oral agreements and undefinitized agreements 
early in humanitarian operations, then transition to predominantly purchase 
orders as the situation stabilizes.  Undefinitized agreements include faxed or e-
mailed offers, and bills of materials for proposed construction services.  Such 
agreements are not considered incomplete (undefinitized) by the PVOs, and 
payments are rendered without formal written contracts.  In contrast, contingency 
contracting officers execute contracts in accordance with regulations.  
Undefinitized agreements are converted to formal contracts.  Also, there is little 
similarity of contract types between the studied PVOs and contingency 
contracting actions.  I could not make price comparisons due to operational 
security, the nature and short duration of the research in Uzbekistan with Heart to 
Heart’s medical airlift, and the lack of written contracts by the studied PVOs.   
Heart to Heart and Samaritan's Purse establish and sustain operations 
and support their procurement through networking.  Networking is their primary 
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source of intelligence as well as market information.  Procurement is a duty of the 
project manager in country, and he or she has full authority over procurement 
decisions.  
4. How can best practices learned from PVO procurement be 
incorporated into contingency contracting?   
a. Training  
In-depth, hands-on training of contingency contracting officers can 
be achieved by expanding their training opportunities.  This can be achieved 
through a short temporary duty (TDY) to an ongoing contingency operation, by 
internships with PVOs, or training simulations and scenarios.  These training 
methods are discussed more in the recommendations section. 
b. Financial Empowerment 
Empowerment of contingency contracting officers that are first 
responders to a contingency with complete financial control can be achieved 
through the application of Executive Order 10789, which gives the agency 
secretary the ability to delegate authority for purchases of under $50,000 to 
whomever necessary in the interest of national defense.  This additional authority 
should be temporary – only until the operation stabilizes – and does not relieve 
the contingency contracting officer of requirements to properly account for funds.   
c. Networking  
Networking with PVOs before and during stability operations to 
gather market information can be achieved by using the CMOC as a conduit into 
the PVO community.  Contingency contracting officers selected to support a 
stability operation can also use internet resources such as ReliefWeb© and 
InterAction© to identify PVOs already working in the theater of operations and 
contact these organizations prior to deployment.  Other sources for PVO contacts 
include the Humanitarian Operation Center, the Humanitarian Assistance 
Coordination Center, the U.S. Embassy or Consulate, or USAID. 
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5. What barriers exist that prevent implementation of best 
practices discovered, and how can these barriers be 
overcome? 
a. Barriers to Additional Training 
The barriers to implementing internships with PVOs or TDYs with 
deployed contingency contracting cells are personnel and funding shortfalls.  
These resource shortfalls cannot be overcome.  Rather, this additional training 
should be carefully limited to a select few contingency contracting officers to 
minimize their impact. Significantly, the need for and benefits of this training grow 
as the military performs fewer stability operations.  When there are fewer 
deployments, contingency contracting officers are not as critical to their units.  
Also, training funds are more available.  Therefore, as the need for the training 
increases, resource availability also increases. 
b. Barriers to Financial Empowerment 
The Federal Acquisition Regulations prevent senior contracting 
officials from delegating additional monetary authority to contingency contracting 
officers and providing them with relief from unnecessary documentation.  This 
barrier exists in part because the full power of Executive Order 10789 and 29 
USC 1431 is rarely applied.  When invoked, Executive Order 10789 and 29 USC 
1431 grant contingency contracting officers complete control of purchases under 
$50,000.  A risk-averse administrative culture can sometimes become a barrier to 
delegation of such broad contracting authority.   
For contingency contracting officers to obtain the flexibility and 
responsiveness they require to be more responsive, Executive Order 10789 and 
29 USC 1431 must be invoked so that regulatory requirements can be waived.  
To invoke when appropriate these powers, leaders with delegation authority at all 
levels must shift from risk aversion to risk management, understanding that the 
benefits of empowerment outweigh the limited risk of granting contingency 
contracting officers full control over purchases under $50,000.  Also, only 
contingency contracting officers who have previously demonstrated reliability and 
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sound judgment in positions of significant responsibility should be selected as 
first responders.  The additional training recommended by this thesis will help 
prepare contingency contracting officers for thoughtful application of financial 
empowerment.  Extant financial accountability and careful selection o f 
contingency contracting officers granted additional authority should successfully 
mitigate the risks of financial empowerment. 
Additionally, during the contingency planning process, the 
contacting staff must include the invocation and duration of needed waivers into 
the contingency contracting support plan.  The hours prior to a short-notice 
contingency contracting operation are not the time to explain the need to 
empower contingency contracting officers.  
c.  Barriers to Networking  
Physical separation is a barrier to networking.  It is difficult to 
communicate with groups that do not have ready access to contingency 
contracting officers.  Locating contracting operations adjacent to the CMOC can 
easily reduce the physical barriers.  This enables contingency contracting officers 
to network with PVOs as they visit the CMOC for updates and coordination.  
Proprietary data restrictions limit the information that can be made 
available to PVOs.  To avoid inadvertent release of restricted information, 
contingency contracting officers may be averse to networking.  Diligence, and 
releasing written, informal synopses of awards via a bid board can prevent 
accidental disclosures of proprietary data. 
If the contingency contracting officer remains mindful of proprietary 
data restrictions when networking with PVOs, the only remaining barrier to 
networking is cultural biases between PVOs and the military.  Members of both 
organizations may view each other through stereotypic lenses that prevent 
cooperation.  PVOs fear that by cooperating with the military they may lose their 
reputation for neutrality.  Military members may see PVOs as nuisances that 
complicate if not frustrate stability operations.  Cultural biases can be overcome 
by increased exposure, civil-military conferences during peacetime, and through 
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internships.  Presidential Decision Directive 56 mandates interagency 
cooperation and encourages including NGOs and PVOs into the planning and 
coordination of complex contingency operations. 
 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
PVOs have a more flexible system by which they manage, fund, and 
execute humanitarian operations and the procurement necessary to support 
those operations.  The lead person on the ground has the management and 
financial authority to rapidly make decisions and commit resources to meet the 
needs of the humanitarian crisis.  The country coordinator or project manager on 
the ground does not make these critical decisions without extensive training as 
noted above.  Finally, PVOs network continuously with each other to obtain 
market and socio-economic information to improve their decision-making.  These 
methods enable PVOs to quickly, successfully, and efficiently respond to crises.  
These same practices can be successfully applied to contingency contracting.   
 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
· Develop realistic contingency contracting scenarios to augment 
current contingency contracting training following a case study 
format.  Conduct interviews with experienced contingency 
contracting officers to create realistic scenarios modeled after 
situations contingency contracting officers commonly face. 
· Send one contracting officer per major command and joint 
command contracting offices for six months or less as an 
intern/military liaison to PVOs or NGOs conducting major 
humanitarian relief operations in the command’s area of 
responsibility or theater.  Attach this contracting officer to the 
procurement staff of the humanitarian organization.  Upon return to 
the contracting office, task the officer to train other contracting 
officers on PVO culture, working with PVOs, business culture, 
socio-economic conditions, and negotiating in the area of 
responsibility. 
· Send contracting officers that have just completed CON 234 and 
are slated to perform contingency contracting duties TDY for up to 
six weeks to an operating, forward deployed contingency 
contracting cell to augment the cell and gain first hand experience.  
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· Empower contingency contracting officers first responding to 
stability operations with complete control of the funds.  Invoke 
Executive Order 10789 to delegate the contingency contracting 
officers establishing operations the ability to make any and all 
decisions regarding purchases under $50,000 without requesting 
approval from higher levels, writing J&As, or D&Fs.  Revoke this 
exceptional authority as soon as the contracting situation stabilizes 
and basic needs are procured for the supported force.  
· Include emphasis on networking with PVOs and NGOs to obtain 
market information in contingency contracting training materials and 
the contracting regulations and guidebooks.  Emphasize the CMOC 
as link to humanitarian organizations. 
· Co-locate the Joint Contracting Cell with the Civil-Military 
Operations Center to leverage each cell’s capabilities with the 
other. 
 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
· Determine the feasibility of creating interactive contingency 
contracting training scenarios using existing web-based technology 
or CD-ROM.  Develop a prototype to test the feasibility and 
evaluate the training value of computer-based training simulations. 
· Assess the feasibility of developing fully empowered Early Entry 
Contracting Teams as an accepted, doctrinal method of executing 
the first six weeks of stability operations.  Determine what size, 
organizational structure, equipment, and additional authority would 
create the most responsive team.  Determine at what level of 
command these teams should reside. 
· Analyze the nearly 200 contracting lessons learned stored in the 
Joint Center for Lessons Learned database, conducting trend 
analysis and Pareto analysis, to glean critical lessons learned, 
reveal needed FAR and FAR Supplement changes, and avoid re-
learning old lessons. 
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APPENDIX B 
The Clinton Administration’s Policy on 
Managing Complex Contingency Operations 
 




This White Paper explains key elements of the Clinton Administration’s 
policy on managing complex contingency operations. This unclassified document 
is promulgated for use by Government officials as a handy reference for 
interagency planning of future complex contingency operations. Also, it is 
intended for use in U.S. Government professional education institutions, such as 
the National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, 
for coursework and exercises on interagency practices and procedures. 
Regarding this paper’s utility as representation of the President’s Directive, it 
contains all the key elements of the original PDD that are needed for effective 
implementation by agency officials. Therefore, wide dissemination of this 
unclassified White Paper is encouraged by all agencies of the U.S. Government. 
Note that while this White Paper explains the PDD, it does not override the 
official PDD.  
Background 
In the wake of the Cold War, attention has focused on a rising number of 
territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars that pose threats to 
regional and international peace and may be accompanied by natural or 
manmade disasters which precipitate massive human suffering. We have learned 
that effective responses to these situations may require multi-dimensional 
operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, 
intelligence, economic development, and security: hence the term complex 
contingency operations.  
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The PDD defines "complex contingency operations" as peace operations 
such as the peace accord implementation operation conducted by NATO in 
Bosnia (1995-present) and the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq called 
Operation Provide Comfort (1991); and foreign humanitarian assistance 
operations, such as Operation Support Hope in central Africa (1994) and 
Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh (1991). Unless otherwise directed, this PDD 
does not apply to domestic disaster relief or to relatively routine or small-scale 
operations, nor to military operations conducted in defense of U.S. citizens, 
territory, or property, including counter-terrorism and hostage-rescue operations 
and international armed conflict.  
In recent situations as diverse as Haiti, Somalia, Northern Iraq, and the 
former Yugoslavia, the United States has engaged in complex contingency 
operations in coalition, either under the auspices of an international or regional 
organization or in ad hoc, temporary coalitions of like-minded states. While never 
relinquishing the capability to respond unilaterally, the PDD assumes that the 
U.S. will continue to conduct future operations in coalition whenever possible.  
We must also be prepared to manage the humanitarian, economic and 
political consequences of a technological crisis where chemical, biological, 
and/or radiological hazards may be present. The occurrence of any one of these 
dimensions could significantly increase the sensitivity and complexity of a U.S. 
response to a technological crisis.  
In many complex emergencies the appropriate U.S. Government response 
will incur the involvement of only non-military assets. In some situations, we have 
learned that military forces can quickly affect the dynamics of the situation and 
may create the conditions necessary to make significant progress in mitigating or 
resolving underlying conflict or dispute. However, we have also learned that 
many aspects of complex emergencies may not be best addressed through 
military measures. Furthermore, given the level of U.S. interests at stake in most 
of these situations, we recognize that U.S. forces should not be deployed in an 
operation indefinitely.  
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It is essential that the necessary resources be provided to ensure that we 
are prepared to respond in a robust, effective manner. To foster a durable peace 
or stability in these situations and to maximize the effect of judicious military 
deployments, the civilian components of an operation must be integrated closely 
with the military components.  
While agencies of Government have developed independent capacities to 
respond to complex emergencies, military and civilian agencies should operate in 
a synchronized manner through effective interagency management and the use 
of special mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts. Integrated planning and 
effective management of agency operations early on in an operation can avoid 
delays, reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned 
ways, and create unity of effort within an operation that is essential for success of 
the mission. 
Intent of the PDD  
The need for complex contingency operations is likely to recur in future 
years, demanding varying degrees of U.S. involvement. The PDD calls for all 
U.S. Government agencies to institutionalize what we have learned from our 
recent experiences and to continue the process of improving the planning and 
management of complex contingency operations. The PDD is designed to ensure 
that the lessons learned -- including proven planning processes and 
implementation mechanisms -- will be incorporated into the interagency process 
on a regular basis. The PDD’s intent is to establish these management practices 
to achieve unity of effort among U.S. Government agencies and international 
organizations engaged in complex contingency operations. Dedicated 
mechanisms and integrated planning processes are needed. From our recent 
experiences, we have learned that these can help to: 
· identify appropriate missions and tasks, if any, for U.S. Government 
agencies in a U.S. Government response;  
· develop strategies for early resolution of crises, thereby minimizing 
the loss of life and establishing the basis for reconciliation and 
reconstruction;  
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· accelerate planning and implementation of the civilian aspects of 
the operation;  
· intensify action on critical funding and personnel requirements early 
on;  
· integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, 
police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate the creation of 
coordination mechanisms at the operational level; and  
· rapidly identify issues for senior policy makers and ensure 
expeditious implementation of decisions.  
The PDD requires all agencies to review their legislative and budget 
authorities for supporting complex contingency operations and, where such 
authorities are inadequate to fund an agency’s mission and operations in 
complex contingencies, propose legislative and budgetary solutions.  
Executive Committee  
The PDD calls upon the Deputies Committee to establish appropriate 
interagency working groups to assist in policy development, planning, and 
execution of complex contingency operations. Normally, the Deputies Committee 
will form an Executive Committee (ExCom) with appropriate membership to 
supervise the day-to-day management of U.S. participation in a complex 
contingency operation. The ExCom will bring together representatives of all 
agencies that might participate in the operation, including those not normally part 
of the NSC structure. When this is the case, both the Deputies Committee and 
the ExCom will normally be augmented by participating agency representatives. 
In addition, the chair of the ExCom will normally designate an agency to lead a 
legal and fiscal advisory sub-group, whose role is to consult with the ExCom to 
ensure that tasks assigned by the ExCom can be performed by the assigned 
agencies consistent with legal and fiscal authorities. This ExCom approach has 
proved useful in clarifying agency responsibilities, strengthening agency 
accountability, ensuring interagency coordination, and developing policy options 
for consideration by senior policy makers.  
The guiding principle behind the ExCom approach to interagency 
management is the personal accountability of presidential appointees. Members 
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of the ExCom effectively serve as functional managers for specific elements of 
the U.S. Government response (e.g., refugees, demobilization, elections, 
economic assistance, police reform, public information, etc.). They implement the 
strategies agreed to by senior policy makers in the interagency and report to the 
ExCom and Deputies Committee on any problems or issues that need to be 
resolved.  
In future complex contingency operations to which the United States 
contributes substantial resources, the PDD calls upon the Deputies Committee to 
establish organizational arrangements akin to those of the ExCom approach.  
The Political-Military Implementation Plan  
The PDD requires that a political-military implementation plan (or "pol-mil 
plan") be developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating U.S. 
Government actions in a complex contingency operation. The pol-mil plan will 
include a comprehensive situation assessment, mission statement, agency 
objectives, and desired endstate. It will outline an integrated concept of 
operations to synchronize agency efforts. The plan will identify the primary 
preparatory issues and tasks for conducting an operation (e.g., congressional 
consultations, diplomatic efforts, troop recruitment, legal authorities, funding 
requirements and sources, media coordination, etc.). It will also address major 
functional / mission area tasks (e.g., political mediation / reconciliation, military 
support, demobilization, humanitarian assistance, police reform, basic public 
services, economic restoration, human rights monitoring, social reconciliation, 
public information, etc.). (Annex A contains an illustrative outline of a pol-mil 
plan.)  
With the use of the pol-mil plan, the interagency can implement effective 
management practices, namely, to centralize planning and decentralize 
execution during the operation. The desired unity of effort among the various 
agencies that is created through the use of the pol-mil plan contributes to the 
overall success of these complex operations.  
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When a complex contingency operation is contemplated in which the U.S. 
Government will play a substantial role, the PDD calls upon the Deputies 
Committee to task the development of a pol-mil plan and assign specific 
responsibilities to the \appropriate ExCom officials.  
Each ExCom official will be required to develop their respective part of the 
plan, which will be fully coordinated among all relevant agencies. This 
development process will be transparent and analytical, resulting in issues being 
posed to senior policy makers for resolution. Based on the resulting decisions, 
the plan will be finalized and widely distributed among relevant agencies. 
The PDD also requires that the pol-mil plan include demonstrable 
milestones and measures of success including detailed planning for the transition 
of the operation to activities which might be performed by a follow-on operation 
or by the host Government. According to the PDD, the pol-mil plan should be 
updated as the mission progresses to reflect milestones that are (or are not) met 
and to incorporate changes in the situation on the ground.  
Interagency Pol-Mil Plan Rehearsal  
A critical aspect of the planning process will be the interagency 
rehearsal/review of the pol-mil plan. As outlined in the PDD, this activity involves 
a rehearsal of the plan's main elements, with the appropriate ExCom official 
presenting the elements for which he or she is responsible. By simultaneously 
rehearsing/reviewing all elements of the plan, differences over mission 
objectives, agency responsibilities, timing/synchronization, and resource 
allocation can be identified and resolved early, preferably before the operation 
begins. The interagency rehearsal/review also underscores the accountability of 
each program manager in implementing their assigned area of responsibility. 
During execution, regular reviews of the plan ensure that milestones are met and 
that appropriate adjustments are made.  
The PDD calls upon the Deputies Committee to conduct the interagency 
rehearsal/review of the pol-mil plan. Supporting agency plans are to be 
presented by ExCom officials before a complex contingency operation is 
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launched (or as early as possible once the operation begins), before a 
subsequent critical phase during the operation, as major changes in the mission 
occur, and prior to an operation's termination.  
After-Action Review  
After the conclusion of each operation in which this planning process is 
employed, the PDD directs the ExCom to charter an after-action review involving 
both those who participated in the operation and Government experts who 
monitored its execution. This comprehensive assessment of interagency 
performance will include a review of interagency planning and coordination, (both 
in Washington and in the field), legal and budgetary difficulties encountered, 
problems in agency execution, as well as proposed solutions, in order to capture 
lessons learned and to ensure their dissemination to relevant agencies.  
Training  
The U.S. Government requires the capacity to prepare agency officials for 
the responsibilities they will be expected to take on in a planning and managing 
agency efforts in a complex contingency operation. Creating a cadre of 
professionals familiar with this integrated planning process will improve the 
USG’s ability to manage future operations. 
In the interest of advancing the expertise of Government officials, 
agencies are encouraged to disseminate the Handbook for Interagency 
Management of Complex Contingency Operations published by OASD(S&R) 
Strategy at (703) 614-0421. 
With the support of the State and Defense Departments, the PDD requires 
the NSC to work with the appropriate U.S. Government educational institutions--
including the National Defense University, the National Foreign Affairs Training 
Center and the Army War College--to develop and conduct an interagency 
training program. This program, which should be held at least annually, will train 
mid-level managers (Deputy Assistant Secretary level) in the development and 
implementation of pol-mil plans for complex contingency operations. Those 
 106
participating should have an opportunity to interact with expert officials from 
previous operations to learn what has worked in the past. Also, the PDD calls 
upon appropriate U.S. Government educational institutions to explore the 
appropriate way to incorporate the pol-mil planning process into their curricula.  
Agency Review and Implementation  
Finally, the PDD directs each agency to review the adequacy of their 
agency’s structure, legal authorities, budget levels, personnel system, training, 
and crisis management procedures to insure that we, as a Government, are 
learning from our experiences with complex contingency operations and 
institutionalizing the lessons learned. 
Annex A: Illustrative Components of a Political-Military Plan for a Complex 
Contingency Operation  
· Situation Assessment. A comprehensive assessment of the 
situation to clarify essential information that, in the aggregate, 
provides a multi-dimensional picture of the crisis.  
· U.S. Interests. A statement of U.S. interests at stake in the crisis 
and the requirement to secure those interests.  
· Mission Statement. A clear statement of the USG’s strategic 
purpose for the operation and the pol-mil mission.  
· Objectives. The key civil-military objectives to be accomplished 
during the operation.  
· Desired Pol-Mil End State. The conditions the operation is intended 
to create before the operation transitions to a follow-on operation 
and/or terminates.  
· Concept of the Operation. A conceptual description of how the 
various instruments of USG policy will be integrated to get the job 
done throughout all phases of the operation.  
· Lead Agency Responsibilities. An assignment of responsibilities for 
participating agencies.  
· Transition/Exit Strategy. A strategy that is linked to the realization of 
the end state described above, requiring the integrated efforts of 
diplomats, military leaders, and relief officials of the USG and the 
international community.  
· Organizational Concept. A schematic of the various organizational 
structures of the operation, in Washington and in theater, including 
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a description of the chain of authority and associated reporting 
channels.  
· Preparatory Tasks. A layout of specific tasks to be undertaken 
before the operation begins (congressional consultations, 
diplomatic efforts, troop recruitment, legal authorities, funding 
requirements and sources, media coordination, etc.).  
· Functional or Mission Area Tasks / Agency Plans. Key operational 
and support plans written by USG agencies that pertain to critical 
parts of the operation (e.g., political mediation/reconciliation, 
military support, demobilization, humanitarian assistance, police 
reform, basic public services, economic restoration, human rights 
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